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In the first chapter, I examine a variety of the factors that affect the price and 
demand of natural gas. Prior natural gas price research approaches utilized well-defined 
time series models. I have taken these historical approaches and explored an alternative 
approach to estimating the model- defined equilibrium market price based on the market 
clearing condition. Assuming that the natural gas market is a relatively efficient market, 
the market equilibrium price induced by the model should track the observed market 
price. A two-step estimation process includes - reduced formed regression estimations for 
each market component in the material balance equation, and solves for the market 
balance equation with identified coefficients and parameters for the market equilibrium 
price. The model results track the market price quite well, in both one period ahead 
forecasts and a simulated 36 months forecast case. 
The second chapter in the series "The Game that Drives the LNG Train" analyzes 
the strategies and decisions of major oil companies’ on selecting regasification terminal 
sites for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) along North American coastlines and 
delivery of regasified gas into regional domestic markets. Each participating firm’s 
decision is extensive and complex, involving multi-years of capital and human 
investments. Furthermore, fierce competition exists among firms procuring LNG cargos 
 vii 
and servicing the same set of demand areas, i.e. the North America market. This paper 
will attempt to condense the whole strategy and decision-making process into a 
simplified multistage model. The model will focus on exploring the strategic elements of 
decisions for each participant firm in the competition through a game-theory lens. 
Extending from previous work on tying, the third chapter seeks a more structured 
result on the relationship of pre-commitment and exclusion due to tying under a Hotelling 
framework. A three-stage model is set up, which includes a conditional pre-commitment 
stage and an entry decision stage preceding the third stage of pricing competition. The 
paper concludes that: first, exclusion is possible even with zero fixed cost, and it is 
executed by conditional pre-commitment of tying upon entry. Second, conditional pre-
commitment of tying only occurs if entry can be excluded, otherwise, tying is not 
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Chapter 1: Structural Estimation of Natural Gas Price in a Rational 
Expectation Market Equilibrium 
1.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Academic researches and industry white papers together host a wealth of 
knowledge on forecasting energy prices, including natural gas prices. Most of the 
recorded methods share two features: first, employed a time series approach, predicting 
price as a function of its own lagged variables. However, the time series approaches often 
fail to capture sudden spikes or drops in price; second, anchored the forecasting model on 
the relationship between natural gas and crude oil. Traditionally natural gas and crude oil 
prices sustained a stable relationship: crude oil price dollar/bbl to natural gas price 
dollar/mmbtu is about 6 to 7:1, which is approximately the heat content equivalence 
between the two commodities. After reaching a peak (120 dollar/bbl for crude oil and 14 
dollar/mmbtu for natural gas) in summer of 2008, prices of crude oil and natural gas 
dropped significantly in September 2008. However crude oil price quickly recovered 
back to about 80 dollars/bbl, but natural gas price has been anemic ever since then and 
hovering around 4 dollar/mmbtu compared to a previous 6-7 dollar/mmbtu level. Hence, 
the relationship between crude oil price and natural gas price in the North America 
market has decoupled and the correlation of the two has materially weakened since 2008, 
and not yet any sign that the two prices will converge back to their prior relationship.  
In this paper, I investigate an alternative method, which captures shifts in market 
conditions by estimating the market price of natural gas based on rational expectation 
market equilibrium.  This approach assumes the existence of a material balance in a 
relatively efficient market, i.e., natural gas market, although there will be small 
discrepancies in evidence. Compared to previous models on this topic, this approach pays 
more attention on the fundamental drivers in the natural gas market, in addition to its 
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relationship to crude oil, and acknowledged and formally estimates the impact of rational 
expectation on market equilibrium.  
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is split into two sections. The first section reviews the 
underlying reasoning on relationship between natural gas and crude oil, and surveys past 
researches on forecasting natural gas and highlights their contributions. The second 
section follows the development of rational expectation market models, which is the 
alternative approach proposed for forecasting natural gas price in current paper.   
1.2.1. A History of Modeling Natural Gas Prices 
In the early stages of studying natural gas prices, the idea that natural gas price 
tracks closely with crude oil price evolved. To understand the origin of this idea, it is 
essential to understand why these two commodities are fundamentally connected in 
energy market.   
On the demand side, natural gas and crude oil are substitutes as choices of fuels 
for space heating as well as electric generation. Energy Information Agency (EIA)’s 2002 
Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey (MECS) estimates about 18% of natural gas 
usage can be switched to petroleum products (Joutz and Villa, 2006).  Based on Energy 
Velocity, there is about 20% of power generation capacity is dual-fired although in 
practice the actual utilization rate of these units are considerably less. Furthermore, fuel 
switching is not only limited to dual-fired units. Additional fuel switching is a result of 
dispatching decisions based on the relative prices of natural gas and resid oil (byproduct 
of crude oil) in the market. Although these percentages seem limited to the existing 
installed capacity in one market, the shift in marginal consumption can often have 
pronounced impact on prices, especially in a tight market. Therefore, an increase in crude 
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oil prices promotes the consumption of the substitute - natural gas - versus petroleum 
products, which in turn increases natural gas demand and hence natural gas prices. 
However, it is worth noting that there has been a constant decline of oil-fueled units in 
Northeast of U.S., where those units are replaced with more efficient and cleaner gas 
units. Therefore, the relationship of fuel switching between oil and gas is expected to be 
increasingly limited going forward.  
On supply side, the focus is the strong long-term relationship between crude oil 
and natural gas.  Natural gas is found in two basic forms – associated gas and non-
associated gas. Associated gas is natural gas that occurs in crude oil reservoirs, either as 
free gas or as gas in solution with crude oil. In 2004, EIA estimated that associated-
dissolved gas comprised about 2.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) or 14% of the marketed natural 
gas production in the United States. When natural gas is produced from a wellhead, there 
are chemical products which need to be extracted prior to shipping it via a pipeline.  
These byproducts must be extracted to comply with natural gas purity requirements set 
by the pipeline owner.  The natural gas chemical byproducts extracted during the refining 
process are referred to as liquids.  Similarly petroleum byproducts as referred to as oil 
liquids.  Natural gas liquids as byproducts of natural gas production are typically also 
byproducts of oil production. This results in a price linkage where natural gas liquids can 
be sold at oil-linked prices. In other words, there exists a linkage between the prices of 
gas and oil.  When oil price become attractive, natural gas production with higher liquid 
content becomes more valuable as a result. In addition to the link between natural gas and 
oil in production and processing stages, crude oil and natural gas are linked together 
through the investment cycles of exploration and production companies. Since the two 
energy sources share similar channels for economic resources and capital markets for 
future development, exploration and drilling technique, it is common to consider the two 
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simultaneously in investment plans. After the breakthrough in horizontal drilling which 
unlocked vast shale gas resources in North America, the next target was to apply the 
same drilling technique on oil shale. As a result, there is knowledge sharing among gas 
and oil production ventures. So, when oil price is much more attractive in the recent 
years, there is a trend for shifting focus of capital investment from gas to oil/liquid focus: 
producers are adjusting their production plans to reallocate rigs into production plays 
which produce oil or more natural gas liquids.  
Therefore, crude oil and natural gas prices are related through both demand and 
supply sides of the market, and it is complicated to determine which linkage is 
dominating at any point in time.  However, there is one thing which is certain: there is an 
underlying structural relationship between natural gas and crude oil, and that serves as a 
basis of past researches on natural gas prices. As the first of this series of literature, Yücel 
and Guo (1994) described the relationship between prices of crude oil and natural gas as: 
crude oil prices is determined by the world oil market conditions, while U.S. natural gas 
prices tend to follow. However, as mentioned earlier, there is increasing evidence of a 
diminishing relationship between crude oil and natural gas: although U.S. natural gas 
prices have followed the general upward trend with the world crude oil price, there are 
also distinctly independent movements. The last episode is the decoupling of the two 
prices since second half of 2008, and it is also the longest in its duration. There were 
other episodes of decoupling occurred throughout the past decade: 2000, 2002, 2003 and 
second half of 2005. 
The decoupling phenomenon between the prices of commodities captured 
curiosity of researchers: Serletis and Rangel-Ruiz (2002) used the daily price of natural 
gas at the Henry Hub and WTI from 1991 to 2001found that although the two prices are 
linked, but Henry Hub and WTI do not have common price cycles as a result of 
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deregulation. Villar and Joutz (2006) followed the same thread of research in more 
details, supporting the findings of Serlitis and Rangel-Ruiz (2002) that the price of WTI 
is weakly exogenous to the price of natural gas at the Henry Hub. Specifically, Villar and 
Joutz find that the price of natural gas adjusts to deviations in the long run evolving 
relationship, but these deviations do not affect the price of WTI. They also found that 
changes in natural gas prices tend to lag behind changes in crude oil prices. Hartley, 
Medlock and Rosthal (2006)’s paper is one of the more recent. Like Villar and Joutz, 
they also focuses on defining a stable co-integrating relationship between natural gas and 
oil prices by adding an additional variable, but they considered technology instead of a 
time trend. Hartley, Medlock and Rosthal have hypothesized that the increased efficiency 
of producing electricity with natural gas is responsible for the increasing decoupling 
between the two commodity prices. The latest study by Villar and Joutz (2007) extends 
the research down to a new direction by revealing that weekly oil and natural gas prices 
still have a powerful relationship. They emphasize that the relationship between the oil 
and gas can be described in a much more consistent way when also adding a more 
extensive set of exogenous variables including weather, storage and production shut-ins 
during hurricanes into the regression.  
In comparison to the past research on natural gas prices, this paper takes a 
different approach by constructing a market equilibrium model, which determines the 
price of natural gas prices. This method has been widely used to model storable 
commodities, such as agriculture products, but it has not been applied to the energy 
commodity space. However, the storable feature as well as the lagged production 
decisions of natural gas makes it suitable for the type of market equilibrium models.  
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1.2.2. Rational Expectation Market Models 
This following section provides a simple introduction to the past research on the 
rational expectation market model that is used this paper. I will not elaborate the long list 
of research performed in this field, but instead only highlight a few aspects of the 
literature which directly relates to my current paper. Irwin and Tharen (2011) provide a 
detailed review of the rational expectation market model and its applications.  
Anticipation for the future values of market variables by the market participants 
has always played an important role in determining economic behavior. Keynes 
considered the role of agents’ anticipation for future events in his 1936 classic General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.  The notion of “rational expectation” came 
much later. Muth (1961) formulates a definition of agents’ expectations that is internally 
consistent with the economic model, which is defined by economists. Muth calls 
expectations that are consistent with the economic model as “rational”. Later on, a 
rapidly growing literature on rational expectation modeling and testing was developed in 
agriculture economics.  Each of agriculture markets that has been studied, is perceived by 
the econometricians as a basic equilibrium supply and demand system. The equilibrium is 
a core feature of the model structure, although there are many variations. 
One of the key challenges in the rational expectation market model, is to properly 
model the rational expectation by market participants. There are a lot of researches, 
which explicitly models the rational expectation behavior of the agents, e.g., Muth, 1961; 
Shonkwile, 1982; Goodwin and Sheffrin, 1982; Eckstein, 1984; and Ghosh, Gilbert and 
Hughes-Hallet, 1987. When future contracts are introduced to the agriculture commodity 
markets, it is designed to be measure of forward-looking expectation that decision makers 
in the market are able to acting upon. The rational expectation market model is used to 
study the impact of the future contracts, on market equilibrium. Turnosvsky (1983) 
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provides a theoretical approach to compare the impact of rational expectation with or 
without future contracts on market equilibrium, and concludes that future contracts are 
effective market instruments to maintain stability of the market equilibrium under 
uncertainty. Furthermore, Choi and Helmberger (1993) take the price of futures as a 
proxy for the expected price as a factor of the decision process in an empirical model, 
compared to the prior pure-theoretical approaches. A key feature of this empirical 
analysis is the estimation of an expected price function using econometrics instead of the 
numerical methods proposed by Lowry et al. (1987) and Miranda and Helmberger 
(1988). The resulting estimates appear to be plausible and the estimated system, though 
simple, tracks history rather well.  The result suggests that econometrics might be a good 
substitute for the numerical methods that have been used recently to estimate expected 
price functions. 
1.3. THEORETIC MODEL SETUP 
This section establishes a simple but general theoretic model, which provides the 
foundation of the later empirical model used in this paper. The theoretic model setup 
follows the framework in Turnosvsky (1983), but the key difference is that futures market 
is not explicitly modeled here. Instead it is treated as a proxy of rational expectation in 
the empirical estimation. 
A partial equilibrium market model is used to describe the natural gas market in 
North America. Besides demand and supply, financial trading and storage are effective 
means to smooth domestic prices in balancing the market with strong demand side 
seasonality and production side uncertainty of delivery. Since the trading component of 
the North America gas market does not prominently influence the market-clearing price, I 
have excluded it in the simple theoretic model without losing the generality of the model. 
I intend to treat the entire North America gas market as one integrated market: although 
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in reality it is comprised of many individual physical market centers, a well-established 
pipeline system helps to effectively balance all markets. By breaking the North America 
market into individual and parallel market centers which are connected through pipelines, 
the market material balance of the structural model are the aggregation of the receipt and 
delivery volume of each and every market centers on the pipeline grid. However, the 
supply areas and demand areas are rarely synchronized in geographic sense, building the 
model at the level of market centers will leads to too much complexity for the scope of 
current research. Hence, modeling North America as one aggregated market is not only 
simpler but also without the loss of generality. The following structural model outlines 
the market characteristics of a commodity market including supply, demand and net 
imports and arbitrage conditions such as storage. 
1.3.1. Material Balance 
The available supply in period t is comprised of production ( ) and net imports (
) plus the withdrawals from carryover storage inventory ( ). The market must 
allocate the total supply of gas among consumption ( ) and injections for carrying over 
for the future storage ( ). The resulting inter-temporal equilibrium is summarized 
in the following material balance equation: 
Eqn1:  
The specification here assumes no losses in storage and internal transportation (pipeline 
fuel losses) and no qualitative difference between all the available commodities in the 
market whether it is from storage or direct production. In the natural gas market, there is a 
small percentage of fuel lost in the transportation and storage processes. In addition, gas 
extracted at wellheads contains liquids and chemicals.  This type of gas is called “wet gas” 
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Hence, the production at period t is the total amount of gas realized from production in 
period t after processing and ready for pipeline delivery, because gas delivered through 
pipelines is regulated in term of quality, and generally similar in term of its chemical 
makeup and heat content with few exceptions.  
1.3.2. Production 
Since gas production activity requires intensive capital and resource allocation, it 
takes time to plan and execute, the production realized in period t is a result of prior 
decisions and planning before current time. For the purpose of discussion here, I assume 
that there exists a time lag of k periods. Due to the lagged nature of production, the 
industry is always interested in monitoring rig counts, as that is a lead factor for 
production levels.  
The representative firm is assumed to be perfectly competitive and to produce its 
output subject to a quadratic cost function. The planned production for period t formed at 
period t-k, , is the strategy variable and the firm’s profit function is defined as: 
Eqn2: 
 
Since firm makes its production decision for period t at period t-k, before the actual 
market condition at period t is known.  Random fluctuations in production conditions and 
investment environments for the period leading to period t are assumed to be beyond the 
control of the firm. Actual production realized at period t is a function of the planned 
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is a function of additional exogenous variables influencing the realized natural gas 
production, and a random shock  with zero mean and finite variance. Combining 
equation 2 and 3 yields: 
Eqn4:  
In order to keep the linearity of the model, I assume that the firm maximizes the 
following one period function of expected profit and its variance:  
Eqn5:  
is the conditional expectation of profit for period t, formed at time t-k, 
is the conditional variance of profit for period t, formed at time t-k. is the 
coefficient describing risk attitude. Based on equation 4, the conditional expectation and 
variance are derived as follows: 
Eqn6: 
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The conditional cross moments formed at period t-k between 𝑝𝑡and are finite and of 
order 1.  All cross moments can be written in term of order, O(∙): 
Eqn8: 
 
Assuming that the number of firms is sufficiently large, the expressions, which are 
smaller than the first order, can be ignored without a loss of generality.  The expected 
mean and variance of profit can be rewritten by this approximation:  
Eqn9:  
Substituting these two expressions into equation 5 yields the objective function: 




Thus, the planned output of the representative firm varies positively with the expected 
spot price, and inversely with its risk associated in the time lag periods for price. 
1.3.3. Storage 
The decision on storage of a commodity, like natural gas, is made based on 
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has a unique seasonal demand pattern, while the production yields do not correlate to the 
same pattern leading to storage arbitrage. Storage arbitrage is common in the 
marketplace. Theoretically, the storage level of period t is determined based on the 
speculator’s anticipation of price changes. Let 𝑠𝑡−1denote the net position in the 
commodity by a speculator entered at period t-1. If the speculator anticipates that the 
price of period t is higher than t-1, then the speculator holds positive stocks of the 
commodity, 𝑠𝑡−1>0; if the speculator anticipates a price drop in period t compared to t-1, 
then 𝑠𝑡−1<0 indicating that speculator is holding the commodity short. Hence, the profit 
of the representative speculator over the period t-1 to period t is: 
Eqn11:  
Where the cost associated with trading storage is in quadratic term here. These consist of 
storage costs if the net position is positive together with transaction and interest costs. 
This is a simplified way to describe the cost of storage, while keeping it in linearity of the 
function. In most cases, it is true and reasonable to assume that d>0 for a well-defined 
inventory demand function. Similar to firms, the objective function of the speculator is: 
Eqn12:  
The parameter  is the degree of risk aversion measure for speculators. Maximizing the 
objective function with respect to st−1 yields the following storage demand function: 
Eqn13:  
This specification asserts that risk averse speculators, when >0, takes a long position or 
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Current consumption of period t is a downward sloping function of current market 
price of natural gas, and it is derived only at the aggregate level without deriving the 
underlying utility maximization for individual customers. Therefore, the aggregate 
demand for the commodity is: 
Eqn14:  
Where c is the constant term and β is the price elasticity of the natural gas demand. X can 
be a set of exogenous factors, which potentially affect demand of gas, such as the price of 
crude oil and weather.  
1.3.5. Net Imports 
Net imports are the difference between imports and exports in the market.  It is a 
function of prices in current market and outside markets. Net imports of period t are 
defined at the aggregate level similar to the consumption function: 
Eqn15:  
can be positive or negative, and does depend on price differentials between the two 
markets: the U.S. market and rest of the world.  includes exogenous variables 
describing both sides of the markets, as well as prices from the rest of the world. Because 
the rest of the world is not the focus of the model, a simplified definition of net imports is 
used without elaboration on conditions in the rest of the world.  
1.3.6. Aggregate Market Relationships 
We can sum over the representation firms leads to the aggregate supply function 
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Eqn16:  , 
 
The aggregate storage function can also be represented in a reduced linear form with 
additional exogenous variables: 
Eqn17: 
 




Therefore, for any sampling period with observed consumption, production and storage, 
there exists a series of spot prices that satisfy the material balance described above. That 
spot price describes the market clearing condition when the market equilibrium is 
sustained.  These clearing prices are denoted as  𝑝𝑡  𝑡=1….𝑇. 
Eqn19:  
A sampling distribution of the difference between  𝑝𝑡  𝑡=1….𝑇 and  𝑝𝑡 𝑡=1….𝑇can be 
calculated based on residuals of each function defined in the market: 
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The interest of the post-estimation discussion focuses on the extreme cases where the 
market observed price of natural gas is statistically different from the calculated 
equilibrium price𝑝𝑡 .  
1.4. DATA 
This section introduces the dataset used for empirical estimation, and explores its 
statistic characteristics. All data used is from EIA. Appendix 1 includes a detailed 
description of each variable included in this paper. Although the data source dates from 
1980s or earlier for some variables, only data from 1994 to 2010 is used for empirical 
estimation in this paper for the following reasons:  
A deregulated market since 1992: 
Although earlier data is available, I have chosen to focus on the post-1992 
timeframe, since this is when the natural gas market was officially “deregulated”.  The 
often referred as the Final Restructuring Rule after a 20 year process of “deregulation and 
unbundling”, the FERC order 636, issued in 1992, states that pipelines must separate their 
transportation and sales services. As a result, all pipeline customers can select their gas 
sales, transportation, and storage services from any provider and in any quantity. The 
deregulation granted all natural gas sells gain equal rights in the marketplace in moving 
natural gas from the wellhead to the end-user or LDC and allows the natural gas customer 
the choice of the most cost effective method of obtaining natural gas. As a result, the 
natural gas market becomes a much more efficient one, compared to its prior state.  
Introduction of Future Contracts of Gas 
Since the price of natural gas futures are used as a proxy for expected market 
price, it is necessary to select the time period when the natural gas future contracts are 
2






present. Future contract is designed and used as a risk management instrument in a high-
volatility price environment. The natural gas futures contracts were initially introduced in 
1994. The Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures (Physical) is an outright natural gas contract 
between a buyer and a seller.  
Table 1 lists all the variables collected for the empirical analysis below.1  Note 
that not all of these variables are used in the final version of the model. Apart from the 
statistics summary, it is important to have a visual concept of the key variables used in 
the model. The natural gas price and its future contract price (contract 1: RNGC1) share 
similar patterns with high correlation. Figure 1 depicts the historic natural gas price with 
its future contract 1 price. Overall, gas prices have been increasing since 1992, with a few 
spikes caused by major weather events, such as those in2000 and 2005. The price spikes 
in 2008, was driven by fast climbing energy prices at the global level.  The spike was 
followed by a sharp decline in fall of 2008. Compare to natural gas prices, crude oil spot 
price and future contract 1 price shares even higher correlation, as there is less volatility 
in crude oil market compared to natural gas.  
Figure 2 shows the historical US gas balance, namely, market consumption, 
production and storage, which is supposed to be bounded to a material balance for each 
period in the theoretical model. Consumption follows a strong seasonal pattern, where 
space heating shapes the peak of the demand every winter, while summer demand from 
electric generation forms a minor peak in July to August. The long-term consumption 
trend is related by general economic conditions and energy efficiency. While 
consumption has a prominent pattern around the year, production barely has any 
seasonality, as is shown in the graph. Storage helps to bridge the gap between 
consumption and production over time, and hence is an important part of the natural gas 
                                                 
1 For details of definition and data source, see Appendix 4.1.  
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infrastructure. Note that production, consumption and storage rarely add up in reality, as 
there are always miscalculations, and other complications. As a result, each year the EIA 




Figure 1: Natural Gas Spot Price vs. Natural Gas Future Contract Month 1 
 







































































































NGHHUUS Natural Gas Henry Hub Spot Price ($/mmBtu) dollars per million Btu

































































































































NGNWPUS Natural Gas Net Withdrawals from Inventory billion cubic feet per day
NGPRPUS Natural Gas Total Dry Production billion cubic feet per day




Name Variable Definition Units Mean Variance Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Median Minimum Maximum Count2 
 
Supply, Demand and Storage 
 
 
        
 
NGCCPUS 
Natural Gas Consumption Commercial Sector U.S. 
Total billion cubic feet per day 8.419 17.437 4.176 0.558 1.854 7.450 3.590 17.230 229 
 
NGMPPUS Natural Gas Total Marketed Production billion cubic feet per day 55.492 7.882 2.808 0.716 4.243 54.890 46.700 63.700 169 
 
NGNWPUS Natural Gas Net Withdrawals from Inventory billion cubic feet per day 0.070 162.370 12.742 0.670 2.016 -5.930 -16.070 27.840 229 
 
NGWGPUS Natural Gas Working Inventory U.S. Total billion cubic feet, end-of-period 2239.12 551359.77 742.536 -0.035 2.094 2273.000 730.000 3847.000 229 
 
BALIT Natural Gas Balancing Item (Consumption - Supply) billion cubic feet per day 0.509 10.175 3.190 -0.552 2.663 1.120 -8.900 6.810 229 
 
USNETIMP




         
 
NGHHUUS Natural Gas Henry Hub Spot Price ($/mmBtu) dollars per million Btu 4.204 6.259 2.502 1.180 4.273 3.450 1.210 13.420 229 
 
WTIPUUS West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil Price dollars per barrel 39.242 695.722 26.377 1.292 4.083 27.600 11.350 133.880 229 
 
RNGC1 Natural Gas Futures Contract 1 Dollar per MMBTU 4.532 6.592 2.567 1.086 4.096 4.000 1.430 13.450 205 
 
RCLC1 Crude Oil Futures Contract 1 dollars per barrel 39.253 697.828 26.416 1.288 4.068 27.620 11.310 134.020 229 
 
Oil and Economy 
 
         
 
PRIMEUS U.S. Prime Lending Rate Percent 6.532 3.819 1.954 -0.326 1.716 6.700 3.130 9.630 229 
 
RSPRPUS Total Raw Steel Production million short tons per day 0.274 0.001 0.033 -1.917 7.859 0.280 0.143 0.328 229 
 
WPCPIUS Producer Price Index: All Commodities Index, 1982=1.00 1.429 0.054 0.232 0.805 2.278 1.320 1.160 2.000 229 
 
COPRPUS U.S. Crude Oil Production million barrels per day 5.890 0.438 0.662 0.146 2.432 5.800 3.930 7.390 229 
 
YD87OUS Real Disposable Personal Income 
Billion chained 2005 dollars – 
SAAR 8280.9 1900650.5 1378.641 -0.100 1.620 8370.000 6059.000 10359.000 229 
 
CICPIUS Consumer Price Index (all urban consumers) Index, 1982-1984=1.00 1.784 0.061 0.247 0.172 1.792 1.770 1.380 2.210 229 
 
GDPDIUS GDP Implicit Price Deflator Index, 2005=100 92.544 120.609 10.982 0.306 1.781 90.800 75.800 111.500 229 
 
GDPQXUS Real Gross Domestic Product 
Billion chained 2005 dollars – 
SAAR 11145.1 2855013.3 1689.678 -0.271 1.688 11358.000 8128.000 13479.000 229 
 
I87RXUS Real Fixed Investment 
Billion chained 2005 dollars – 
SAAR 1789.88 73722.658 271.519 -0.452 2.367 1811.000 1219.000 2206.000 193 
 
USEXRATE 
Exchange Value of U.S. Dollar: Broad Index 




         
 
ZWCDPUS Cooling Degree-days U.S. Average degree-days per month 107.825 14215.145 119.227 0.933 2.424 47.000 2.000 388.000 229 
 
ZWHDPUS Heating Degree-days U.S. Average degree-days per month 367.004 100745.54 317.404 0.375 1.700 302.000 2.000 1012.000 229 
 
Table 1: List of Variables 
                                                 




In the structural model, there exists one type of variables, which describe market 
expectation - expected market price of time t at prior time periods, like t-k, k>=1. These 
market expectation variables appear in both production as well as storage functions, 
where expectations of the future influence the strategic decisions. In reality, the market 
expectations of future are not directly observed. Theoretically, every agent of the market 
has his/her own expectation of the market and acts based on those values. Fortunately, the 
natural gas market has an established future and option-trading place, where agents have 
the choice to trade standardized future contracts based on their expectations. The futures 
market clears every day, and the settlement prices are reported. In the estimation process 
of the model, the price of a natural gas future contract is used in the empirical estimation 
as a proxy of market expectation of future price.  
The process of estimation takes the following two steps: the first step is to 
estimate the demand, production and storage functions based on the structural model, and 
identify coefficients of the reduced form functions.  The second step is to solve for the 
market clearing price from the material balance of the market based on the coefficients 
obtained from the previous step assuming the material balance exists at all times. These 
market-clearing prices, denoted as  𝑝𝑡  𝑡=1….𝑇, are compared to the observed market spot 
prices  𝑝𝑡 𝑡=1….𝑇. The discussion focuses on the inference drawn from the differences 
between the two prices. 
1.5.1. Regression 
This section goes through the details of the estimation of regressions for this 
model, including the details of tests and diagnosis of these regressions. 
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1.5.1.1. Definition of Regressions 
The first step of the estimation process is to estimate demand, supply, storage and 
net imports separately.  
Regression of Consumption 
Eqn21:Regression of Consumption 
𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡







+ 𝜀1𝑡  
𝑛𝑔𝑡𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡  - U.S. Total Natural Gas Consumption at period t 
𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡  - U.S. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price at period t 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑞𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑡  -  - U.S. GDP at period t 
𝑧𝑤𝑐𝑑𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡- U.S. Average Cooling Degree Days at period t 







- Monthly Dummies at period t 
Instrumental variables and first stage regression of 2SLS for natural gas price variable, 
𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 : 
Eqn22: 
𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1 ∗ 𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜑2 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡  
𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡−1- U.S. Natural Gas Rig Counts at period t-1 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡– NYMEX Crude Oil Future Contract (Prompt Month) at period tAs discussed 
in the structural model, the consumption of natural gas is function of current period gas 
price and other exogenous variables, like weather and economic conditions. The 
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consumption of natural gas is driven largely by weather.  For example, space heating in 
the winter and as a fuel choice for power generation for air-conditioning in the summer. 
The weather variables used here are the U.S. average heating degree days and cooling 
degree days, which are the measurement of the number of degree above/below 65 
degrees. In other words, it is a measurement of how cold/warm a location is. The higher 
the heating degree days, the colder a location is and hence there is a higher demand for 
gas for space heating. The higher the cooling degree days, the hotter a location is and 
hence there is a higher demand for air-conditioning.  This in turn infers a greater demand 
for natural gas for power.  Hence, the heating degree days and cooling degree days are 
expected to have positive coefficients for gas demand.  
In addition, general economic condition is included as an exogenous variable for 
the regression of gas consumption. Higher economic condition drives consumption of 
natural gas in commercial/industrial sectors, as well as power generation, which will also 
influence gas demand indirectly via the fuel choice.  The U.S. GDP is used as a measure 
of current period’s economic condition, and is expected to influence gas consumption 
positively.3 
The Henry Hub spot price of period t is the representation of the current gas price. 
This is the market price for physical transactions happening at Henry Hub in Louisiana, 
which is the most quoted natural gas pricing hub in North America. Since a majority of 
gas consumption is related to weather, residential and commercial sectors are less 
responsive to price changes in real time, when compared to industrial sectors and electric 
generation. Additional investigation can be performed to determine the price 
responsiveness for each sector, but it is not included for the current estimation. In this 
                                                 
3 Other macroeconomic indicators like personal income and CPI are tested in the same regression with 
GDP. GDP has the better explanatory power for gas demand in this case.  
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model, the coefficient of natural gas price against gas consumption describes the price 
responsiveness at the aggregated level.  
Regression of Production 
Eqn23: 
𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡












 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑞𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑡−6 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡−3 + 𝛽5 ∗△ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑡  
𝑛𝑔𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡 − U.S. Marketed Natural Gas Production at t 
𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑖|𝑡−24  - NYMEX Natural Gas contract i at period t-24 
𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑐𝑖|𝑡−12- NYMEX Natural Gas contract i at period t-12 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑞𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑡−6 − U.S.GDP at period t-6 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡−3 − U.S.WTI Crude Oil Price at period t-3 
△ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑠𝑡 − Change in U.S.Prime Lending Rate at t 
ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 − Dummy variable for Major Hurricanes in Gulf of Mexico at period t 
For gas production available in period t, it is determined before period t. This has been 
previously discussed in the theoretical model setup. In the structural model, producers 
determines the production decisions for period t based on an ex-ante price expectation, 
which is denoted as𝑃𝑡|𝑡−𝑘
𝑒 . The reduced form regression uses lag 24 period average 





𝑖=1 , as the ex-ante expectation of 
current period price. Despite its long name, this average price of future contract strip 
(multiple points along forward price) is an effective indicator of expected market 
condition for the following reasons:  
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1) Using an average of future contract prices, instead of a single future contract 
price, allows the production decision to focus on a general future market, instead of one 
specific month. The production decision made 24 months prior to the current period is the 
initial capital allocation and resource commitment for production about two years in the 
future.  However, it is not intended to have an exact delivery time down to the monthly 
level. For example, there are other variables can also shift the production delivery 
timeline. Therefore, this regression includes other lagged variables indicating additional 
adjustment of the production plan after the initial commitment.  
2) Choosing an expectation from 24 months prior to the current period has to do 
with the operation cycle of upstream exploration and production. Upstream operations are 
determined, not a month or two ahead, but approximately two years ahead of actual 
production. 
One additional adjustment to the production plan is to the lag 12 period average 





𝑖=1 . Consider the fact that 
producers are not making one production decision, but a series of production decisions 
for future periods at the same time. Producers always like to schedule more than their 
production delivery to the period with the highest predicted price, if they can. This adds 
much more complexity into the producers’ decision strategy on production for each 
period. So intuitively taking the 24 months lead-time into consideration, producers are 
constantly shifting and readjusting their future production plan if they can. If the expected 
market conditions in 24 months are better, not only do producers naturally commit more 
capital and resources for the 24-month production delivery plan, but also this decision 
can potentially affect ex-ante plans for production delivery closer than 24 months. Due to 
the interest on investment in 24 months, producers can readjust their previously 
committed capital and resource for production delivery before the expected market boom 
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in 24 months. In other words, producers will hold off the near term production delivery 
and reallocate those resources to target the expected market boom in a later period. If the 
dynamic allocation aspect exists when the producer making their decision, the 12-month 
lagged average future price strip (1-24 month contracts) is expected to have a 
significantly negative coefficient to current production level, as a delaying effect.  
Other lagged variables are the six-month lagged U.S. GDP, and the three-month 
lagged crude oil price.  Both of these lags have been tested and identified as the most 
effective choices against their alternatives. Therefore, it reveals the interesting insight of 
a six-month delay for gas production to reflect macroeconomic conditions, and about a 
three-month delay to reflect changes in the oil market. Lagged economic conditions are 
expected to have positive effect on gas production.  In other words, the better the 
economy is, the higher gas production. Lagged oil prices are expected to have negative 
effect on gas production. Oil and gas usually have large overlaps in resource and capital. 
When oil prices increase, producers are more attracted to oil production and tend to shift 
their capital commitment away from gas. Oil and gas share similar labor and material for 
production activities. When oil prices increase, boosted oil production may also increase 
the labor and material price. That leads to higher cost and longer lead times for services 
and inputs on the gas production side as well.  
Two variables that describe conditions in the current time period that may have an 
impact on gas production are the change in U.S. prime lending rate and hurricanes. Prime 
lending rates reflect the tightness of the capital market.  An increase in the prime-lending 
rate puts stress on production activities, as gas production operations depend on cash flow 
heavily. Also extreme hurricanes that hit the Gulf of Mexico area can force the gas 
production operation to shut down. This is referred to as “forced majeure” in the industry, 
or excused non-delivery of production caused by natural disasters.  
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Regression of Storage 
Eqn24: 
              𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑤𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡





 + 𝜀3𝑡  
𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑤𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡- U.S. Natural Gas Net Withdrawals at period t 
𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡  - U.S. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price at period t 
𝑟𝑛𝑔𝑐1𝑡−1– NYMEX Natural Gas Future Contract (Prompt Month) at period t-1 
𝑧𝑤𝑐𝑑𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡- U.S. Average Cooling Degree Days at period t 







- Monthly Dummies at period t 
Instrumental variables and first stage regression of 2SLS 
Eqn25: 
𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 = ⋋0+⋋1∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 +⋋2∗ 𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡 +⋋3∗ 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑞𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝓋𝑡  
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡– NYMEX Crude Oil Future Contract (Prompt Month) at period t 
𝑐𝑟𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡  - U.S. Active Crude Oil Rig Counts at period t 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑞𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑡−1 - U.S. GDP at period t-1 
The net withdrawal of gas storage is a function of the expected price of next period and 
current spot price in the theoretical model. In reality, the expected price of next period is 
not the current future contract 1.  Instead, it is more like the past period’s future contract 
1 like shown in the reduced form regression above. It may appear to be difficult to 
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comprehend the choice of variable here from a theoretical point of view. However, the 
reason has little to do with theory, but much to do with the common practice of trading on 
gas storage.  In most natural gas trading shops, storage deals for the current month are 
locked in by the end of prior month. In other words, decisions on withdrawals of natural 
gas from storage facilities in current month are largely determined by end of last month, 
using the expected price of current month (lagged 1 future contract 1 in past month). 
However, the decision is not final and there is still some room for correction as traders 
move through the current period. That part of trading is usually handled at the “Cash 
Desk” in a trading shop. The purpose of the “Cash Desk” is mainly to deal with weather 
and maintenance issues. The “cash desk” has the opportunity to adjust deals based on the 
realized spot price in the current month. The higher the expected future price is, the less 
the withdrawal from storage facilities in the current period and vice versa.  
Due to the potential Endogeneity problem, the current price of gas is regressed 
with additional instrumental variables, such as the current oil price, current oil drilling 
activities and one-month lagged U.S. GDP level.  
Regression of Net Imports 
Eqn26: 
         𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡
= 𝑑0 + 𝑑1 ∗ 𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑑2 ∗ 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑞𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑑3 ∗ 𝑧𝑤𝑐𝑑𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑑4 ∗ 𝑧𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑑5
∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑑6 ∗ 𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝑑7 ∗ wp57iust + +𝜀4𝑡  
𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡  - U.S. Net Imports of Natural Gas at period t 
𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡  - U.S. Henry Hub Natural Gas Price at period t 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑞𝑥𝑢𝑠𝑡  -  - U.S. GDP at period t 
𝑧𝑤𝑐𝑑𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡- U.S. Average Cooling Degree Days at period t 
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𝑧𝑤ℎ𝑑𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡  - U.S. Average Heating Degree Days at period t 
𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑡- U.S. Raw Steel Production at period t 
𝑤𝑝57𝑖𝑢𝑠𝑡  - U.S. Petroleum Product Price Index at period t 
Instrumental variables and first stage regression of 2SLS 
Eqn27: 
𝑛𝑔ℎℎ𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1 ∗ 𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜑2 ∗ 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡  
𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡−1- U.S. Natural Gas Rig Counts at period t-1 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑡– NYMEX Crude Oil Future Contract (Prompt Month) at period t 
U.S. imports natural gas (LNG) from Canada every year.  It also imported from other 
international destinations as liquefied natural gas. The amount of LNG is relatively small 
and only started after 2003. Therefore, I am going to focus on the drivers determining the 
net imports from Canada. Canada and U.S. exchange natural gas across borders in both 
directions every year though pipelines.  In most years there are net positive imports to 
U.S.. When the price in the U.S. market, more likely hubs near the border, is more 
competitive, more gas is imported into U.S. market. Since only one representative market 
hub, Henry Hub, is included in this model, the competitive advantage from price on net 
imports may not be as strong as expected. The net imports from Canada are also affected 
by the price of crude oil. Western Canada has one of the largest oil sand deposits in the 
world and it takes natural gas as a form of input material. Therefore, when crude oil 
prices increase, the demand for oil sand production boosts the demand for natural gas in 
the Alberta area. That leads to fewer net imports to U.S. market. 
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1.5.1.2. Regression Diagnosis 
It is important to examine the regression and data for potential violations against 
assumptions of the proposed linear regression and to treat these violations properly. This 
section covers the regression diagnosis on a high level. 
Outliers and Influence: 
The natural gas market is quite efficient.  As a result, the data set exhibits no 
strong evidence for outliers. Most of the outliers are related to influential events, like 
hurricane seasons, or economic recession.  In the past decade, this led to spikes in prices. 
However, those events carry unique information about the characteristics of the market 
system, and the elimination of outliers is not always the solution in those cases.  
Endogeneity:  
Endogeneity are treated by introducing instrumental variables (IV) to the natural 
gas price. The only regression that does not have any IVs is the regression of natural gas 
production, as it is solely determined by pre-determined variables prior to period t in this 
case.  
Homoscedasticity 
One of the main assumptions for the ordinary least square regression is the 
homogeneity of variance of the residuals. Violations of homoscedasticity make it difficult 
to gauge the true standard deviation of the forecast errors, usually resulting in confidence 
intervals that are either too wide or too narrow. For each regression defined in this model, 
I test for Homoscedasticity based on both the White test and Breusch Pagan test. The 
only regression leads to sufficient evidence against the null hypothesis of homogeneous 
variance is the regression of production and the treatment is to calculate 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent (HC) standard errors.  
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1.5.1.3. Regression Results 
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adj. R2 0.967 0.851 0.917 0.856 
p-values in parentheses: *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Table 2: Regression Results 
1.5.2. Identification 
Based on the linear regression estimates from the previous theoretical model setup 
discussion, it is easy to identify all the linear coefficients of the model. Most of the 
parameters can be identified directly and I will not spend time elaborating in this section. 
However, the reduced form regression method cannot identify any composite 
coefficient, which is a nonlinear function of other theoretically defined parameters. For 
example, the coefficient of the expected price for period t in production regression is a 
function of three parameters: cost of production, risk aversion factor, and the variance of 
expectation. 
Eqn28:  ,  
Those are parameters that may bring interesting insights since they can be identified 
under a numerical estimation regime like Maximum Likelihood.  Albeit, at a higher cost 
of computational requirements. Also, numerical estimation can sometimes be costly yet 
not effective: Identification problems  can still occur when the data lacks information. 
A simpler way to work around this identification issue here is based on the 
industry knowledge.  There are general assumptions on the range of cost of production 
and variance of expected prices which can lead to some rather insightful results, without 
pinning down the exact number.  For example: 
, ,
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That says in order to have a risk-averse factor (negative one), the cost of production has 
to be greater than $1.37. Based on the various sources for the cost of production, the cost 
of natural gas production is on average much higher than this threshold. The natural gas 
production cost is on average above three to four dollars, depending on the production 
area. It is therefore safe to conclude that the production agents in the market are risk-
averse. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the risk aversion factor on storage agents 
1.5.3. Price Estimation and Discussion 
Following the theoretical model, this section compares the model one-period 
ahead forecasted prices defined by the material balance versus the realized natural gas 
spot prices in the market.  This section focuses on the implications of the disequilibrium, 
where the observed market price is outside of the 95% confidence interval of sample 
distribution for the predicted prices. For each period in the sample, the one period ahead 
forecasted price is calculated and plotted against the realized natural gas spot price in the 
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Figure 3: One Period Ahead Forecast Price vs. Observed Price 
Figure 4  includes the 95% confidence interval of the sample distribution for the 
predicted prices, and the red dots represent periods where the observed price is outside of 
the 95% confidence internal of the predicted prices. In other words, the predicted prices 
are statistically different from the observed prices in those periods, which happens about 
15% of the time during the sample period.  
The following discussion is to understand the implications of these disequilibrium 
periods where the observed market prices are significantly different from what the model 
predicts. These disequilibrium periods are treated as clusters of points for the general 
time period, instead of individual dots in the following discussion. These time periods are 
being discussed and examined carefully, to justify the inconsistency presented between 
the market and the model. Below are my findings: 
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Due to the lack of a financial futures market, the predicted price is consistently 
spikier than the observed market price. This results in disequilibrium where the predicted 
market price indicates a more volatile environment when there is a disturbance in the 
material balance; while the observed market manages to skip or minimize the spike. That 
is primarily due to the fact that most market participants: consumers, producers and 
speculators are all active in the financial market and have already taken positions to 
mitigate these risks. Even though a material change in the gas balance, would lead to a 
spike in prices, these responses are “muted” due to the pre-cautionary measures taken in 
the financial market.  Participants are protected to a certain degree from unexpected 
changes in the market.  This is reflected as a milder reaction in price. Unfortunately, there 
is no data on the detailed hedge positions for each market participant groups. Only 
aggregated transaction volume data is available, which is not sufficient to tell exactly 
how much of resolved market volume has been hedged for each market participant group 




Figure 4: One Period Ahead Forecast Price vs. Observed Price with 95% CI 
The impact of hurricanes on gas prices:  
Although the regression of production takes into account of the interruptions for 
past hurricanes, each hurricane has different degree of impact on the gas production in 
the Gulf of Mexico area.  The impact is dependent not only on the hurricane category, but 
also the specific hurricane path through the area. Figure 5 shows a 10-year history of gas 
production shut-ins from hurricanes up to 2005, and Figure 6 shows the shut-in impact 
from Hurricanes Gustav and Ike in 2008. The volumes of shut-ins vary across these 
observed hurricanes, as well as durations. The two past Hurricanes seasons with most 
shut-ins and the longest durations are Hurricane Katrina/Rita in 2005 and Hurricane Lily 
in 2002 according to the figures published by EIA. Hurricane Gustav and Ike in 2008’s 
impact are just below the top two hurricanes, but the duration between these two 
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hurricanes was much longer since they hit the Gulf of Mexico in less than two weeks 
apart.  
 
Source: EIA (EES 2005) 
Figure 5: Shut-ins from Hurricanes from 1995 to 2005 
 
Source: MMS News Release 




Figure 7: Disequilibrium associated with Hurricane Shut-ins 
By marking those periods of hurricane seasons we see a cluster of disequilibrium 
in the market when comparing the predicted price with historical market realized prices. 
However, closer examination reveals that the predicted market prices also suggests very 
prominent spikes in the price and portrays a reasonable portrait of the underlying market 
observations. Since the price magnitudes swing within a higher range, like $8.00 in 2002, 
and over $13.00 in 2005 the difference between the spikes can easily slip out of the 
equilibrium confidence band.  The equilibrium confidence band is not calculated based 
on the real-time volatility of the price, but instead a fixed value range across the whole 
same period. Based on careful observation, it is prudent to conclude that the model does 
capture the price response due to extreme weather events in the past relatively well.  
Some errors tend to be larger, such as when the price jumps are double or triple the 
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market price prior to the events. Hence, these disequilibria should not be considered as a 
concern in specification of the model itself.  
Impact of the economics of production and drilling activities on prices 
Besides weather events, the rest of the disequilibria are analyzed by adding other 
factors onto the graph to understand the reasons for oscillations. For example, the number 
of gas rigs as well as the breakeven price of gas production. The following two charts 
analyze these oscillations in two separate time period: 1998-2004 and 2005-2009.  
1998-2004 Period: 
By adding the drilling rig count and breakeven price, it is easier to decipher the 
price movements in the history. For example, at the beginning of 1998, the price of 
natural gas was close to the breakeven price of production, and occasionally dipped 
below the breakeven point.  Therefore, drilling rig count dropped since beginning of the 
year, and set the stage for future price increases in the next few years. Note that this is 
consistent with the inclusion of a lag between drilling decisions and realized market price 
impact, as discussed in the regression of production. Prices increased dramatically 12 
months after the drilling rig count reached the bottom in middle of 1999. However, as the 
rig count always lags in market response, the rig count continued to increase after the 
price spike in 2001.  The drilling activities were most likely determined prior to the price 
spike and bound by contracts. Rig count increased after the price spike and overcorrected 
the balance. The price collapsed below the breakeven point in 2002 and struggled to 
recover for rest of the year. For the next two years, the price of natural gas struggled to 
stay above the breakeven price, which was increasing due to the escalation in labor and 
input material costs.  A very interesting and important observation starts to emerge here: 
when the gas price dips below or oscillates around the breakeven price, there are usually 
periods of disequilibria when market price is significantly different from the model 
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predicted prices, such as in the beginning of 1998 and end of 2003 to rest of 2004. Only 
two disequilibria periods which have prices above the breakeven price, are during the 
price spike of 2001, where the predicted price was about one period lagged compared to 
the market observation.  
 
Figure 8: Disequilibrium associated with drilling rig count and breakeven cost of 
production 
2005-2009 Period: 
In the period of 2005-2009, the first year’s disequilibria concentrate around the 
Hurricane season and the following months. Starting from 2006, the gas price dropped 
back to the breakeven price level and started oscillations around the breakeven point 
again for rest of 2005 and 2007. Similarly, in the prior period the disequilibria of the 
markets appeared in 2006 when market observations diverged significantly from the 
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model predicted prices. In 2008, the gas price increased following one external factor.  
Crude oil price at the global level rose and crashed quickly along with the oil price when 
the great recession was trigged by the failure of the financial market in September 2008.  
Based on observations of disequilibria occurrences during 1998-2009, it appears 
that the market tends to diverge away from the model defined market equilibrium more 
than usual when the gas price is below or crossing the breakeven price level of gas 
production. In the theoretically defined model, there is no optimal solution for any market 
participant when price is not covering the variable cost of production. Hence, the 
predicted market price is always supposed to be above the breakeven price. Although the 
breakeven price is not explicitly modeled in the current setup, it is not hard to see that the 
breakeven price triggers a behavior change in market price in a way that is hard to predict 
by the model. In other words, when market price goes below and back from the 
breakeven price, there can be some regime switching responses in the price mechanism, 
which are not captured in the current model. 
Summarizing the discussions so far on the disequilibria, we conclude two 
occasions which have repeated evidence in the observed sample periods, when the model 
predicted price would be significantly different (out of the 95% confidence interval based 
on the sample distribution):  
Under extreme weather conditions, like major hurricanes with prolonged shut-in 
periods, the market price tends to spike and the model is generally able to capture the 
event of the spikes, but not easy to identify the magnitude of the price jump. Due to the 
fact that the price spikes are usually about 2-3 times of the prior price level, the indication 
of larger predicted errors are less significant and important in that regard. 
When gas price in the market dipped below the breakeven level of gas production, 
which is not a likely case in the theoretical model.  The theoretical model tends to have 
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difficulty predicting the movement of the price in the following months. This is probably 
due to a likely regime switch effect triggered when the price falls below or stay too close 
to the breakeven level. This switch effect leads to shift in short term market responses in 
prices from producers and other market participants, which are not explicitly modeled in 
the current setup. The price does not cover the breakeven cost and so change can modify 
part of the behavior of the producers immediately since the production operation is 
sensitive to cash flow. However, due to exactly the same dependence on cash flow, part 
of the production activities are hedged and bound by long-term contracts. The volume of 
production is determined based on real well economics and how much is bound by 
contracts.  The responses from the market will vary time from time, and region from 
region.  
1.6. SIMULATION 
In this section, a 3-year ahead forecasted price is calculated to put the forecast 
capability of the underlying model to the test. The period to be simulated is from April 
2006 to April 2009. The forecasted prices are generated iteratively based on the market 
expectation equilibrium, assuming all exogenous variables are realized in line with their 
observed values in the simulated time frame.  
The forecasted price from the model is graphed in green in comparison to the red 
– the observed market price in Figure 9. The forecasted 3-year curve tracks reasonably 
well to the observed market price in the period, which includes some significant price 
movements. Although there are still sizable predicted errors during the predicted period 
(on average about 0.92 cents), it is key to recognize that the underlying forecast model 




Figure 9: Forecasted Prices (Started from Apr. 2006 to Apr. 2009) vs. Observed 
Prices 
1.7. EXTENSION 
In the following section, I have explored the polynomial regression to estimate the 
coefficients.  By doing so, I test if there is any gain in the forecast capability of the 
model, when moving from the linear assumption of the price relationships with 
underlying observed decisions in the market to a nonlinear one.  
By adding polynomial expansion terms of selected independent variables, the 
original linear regressions are extended to be nonlinear – order two or three or beyond – 
to harvest any extra explanatory power. Starting from the original linear form, a 
polynomial expansion of order 1, additional nonlinear terms are added for the next order 
of the polynomial expansion. All additional nonlinear terms are tested jointly under a 
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hypothesis for statistic significance. This exercise of expanding the regression equations 
iterates until the statistic test shows jointly insignificant estimates for additional terms. 
Most of the linear regressions from the model tend to gain explanatory power for the 
polynomial expansion of order 2 and 3, and most of them have little evidence of 
improvement after the polynomial expansion of order 3.  
By introducing nonlinear terms in to the regressions, it converts the material 
balance into a nonlinear equation for natural gas price. Fortunately, solving nonlinear 
equations for a single variable is a readily available option in many statistical packages 
without knowing the closed form solution of the interested variable here.  
The 𝑝𝑡  is calculated based on the nonlinear material balance equations shows 
improvement of fitting to the underlying observed price.  However, the sample 
distribution’s standard deviation is also smaller due to the smaller estimated error (the 
confidence interval bands are 20% narrower in the nonlinear model).  Overall, in Figure 
10, there is clear evidence of improvement of explanatory power in calculated 𝑝𝑡  based 
on the polynomial expansions, while the confidence interval bandwidth shrinks due to 
smaller estimated errors from the regressions (from 0.67*2 to 0.42*2). There is less 
disequilibrium in the nonlinear case, and most of those occurrences are concurrent with 
the linear case. The occurrence of disequilibrium in nonlinear model is reduced to 6% 
during the sample period – 94% of the time the model produces statistically consistent 
results.  
The trade-offs in the polynomial expansion are: 1) losing the identification power 
with some interesting theoretical model coefficients, which are not easily obtained with a 
closed form in this case; 2) Solving nonlinear equation can get complicated and 




Figure 10: Disequilibrium and Forecasted Prices from Nonlinear Regression Model vs. 
that from Linear Regression Model 
1.8. CONCLUSION 
Prior natural gas price research approaches utilized well-defined time series 
models.  The goal of this paper was to explore an alternative approach and to estimate the 
model defined equilibrium market price based on the market clearing condition. 
Assuming that natural gas market is a relatively efficient market, the market equilibrium 
price induced by the model should track the observed market price.  
A two-step estimation process includes- reduced formed regression estimation for 
each market component in the material balance equation, and solving for the market 
balance equation with identified coefficients and parameters for the market equilibrium 
price.  The model results track the market price quite well, in both one period ahead 
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forecasts and a simulated 36 months forecast case.  For each disequilibrium occurrences, 
where the market price is statistically different from the predicted model price (based on 
95% confidence interval), I examine the market conditions and look for emerging 
patterns prior to the occurrences. It appears that there are two scenarios where the market 
price is more likely to diverge from the equilibrium price based on the current model: (1) 
extreme hurricane seasons; (2) when the price of market oscillates below/around the cost 
of production of gas. The second scenario indicates that the market misbehaves when the 
market price approaches the long term breakeven of production based on the structural 
model, implying a likely regime-switching story.  The proximity around the breakeven 
level can be regarded as a trigger for the shift. This can be an extension of the current 
structural model.   
A 36-month ahead price forecast during 2006-2009 based on the model 
successfully captures the major price movements during the forecasted period, which 
provides concrete evidence for the validity of the current approach and the consistent 
impact of the fundamental market drivers on prices.  
The structural model is defined in linear terms for relatively easy parameter 
identification. However, to examine whether there is any gain on explanatory power of 
the model by extending to nonlinear models, I have used a polynomial expansion method 
to convert the original reduced form linear regression to nonlinear ones. The results show 
that most of the regressions result in a positive improvement in explanatory power under 
a order 2 to 3 polynomial expansion and the final regression residual generally shrinks 
about 20% compared to its linear version. As a result, the predicted equilibrium price also 
tracks closer to the observed market price with fewer disequilibrium occurrences. This 
extension implies improvement for model specification under nonlinear setting.  
In conclusion, there are two findings:  
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First, the natural gas market moves in an effective fashion where it is possible to 
predict its price movement based on a structural model, such as evidence for possible 
regime switching behavior in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, it is proven that this 
complicated energy market still follows consistently with its main fundamental market 
forces and those impacts can be estimated.  
Second, the impact of rational expectation is proven to be significant and stable in 
the natural gas market.  It is a key factor which drives the market but is easily to be 
ignored or mis-specified. This paper provides evidence that a proper representation of 




Chapter 2: The Game that Drives the LNG Train 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the strategies and decisions of major oil companies’ on 
selecting regasification terminal sites for importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) along 
North American coastlines and delivery of regasified gas into regional domestic markets. 
Each participating firm’s decision is extensive and complex, involving multi-years of 
capital and human investments. Furthermore, fierce competition exists among firms 
procuring LNG cargos and servicing the same set of demand areas, i.e. North America 
market.  
This paper condenses the whole strategy and decision making process into a 
simplified multistage model.  The model will focus on exploring the strategic elements of 
decisions for each participant firm in the competition through a game-theory lens.  
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The focus of the paper is spatial equilibrium under cournot competition. Spatial 
competition has a rich and diverse literature, which is started by the seminal work of 
Hotelling (1929). Without mentioning a long list of past research, I intend to outline the 
major branches and categories of this research topic and identify the position of my 
research under the existing literature classification. My review loosely follows the 
taxonomy proposed by Eiselt and Gaporte (1996) and other examples of papers and 
surveys in competitive location models are Eiselt et al. (1993) and Fresz et al. (1988).  
The foremost important component of the competitive location model is the 
definition of the space where the customers and facilities are located. The simplest space 
is one-dimensional, such as a linear or circular market.  In this space, all locations can be 
represented by a single coordinate. A logical extension from one dimensional market is a 
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subset of n-dimensional real space, which has relatively few research results available 
due to its heavy computational requirements. In another perspective of extension, all 
space can be setup either discretely or continuously. Traditional linear and circular 
markets are classified as continuous space where the demand is located along the market 
segment with a continuous distribution. Alternatively, the space can be defined as 
discrete but still interesting and practical, for example,  a network. The demand is defined 
on the nodes of the network and the markets are connected by transportation routes, but 
mathematically separated. Hence, the network setup provides a sense of multi 
dimensional space with less demanding computational requirements. Here, we choose to 
have a discrete network space where markets are defined as nodes or vertices on the 
network.  
The second component of any competition location model is the definition of 
entry and post-entry strategy, of which literature can be described through two criteria:  
(1) the number of entrants in the entry/location game (first stage) and  
(2) the consideration of strategic variables in the post entry/location game (second 
stage).  
Depending on if there is defined cost of entry, the total number of entrants in a 
multiple entrant model can either be determined exogenously (fixed entry) or 
endogenously (free entry). In the free entry case, there are potential entrants that have the 
choice of not entering.  There are several papers which consider a fixed number of 
entrants into the market, such as Hansen and Thisse (1981), Wendell and McKelvey 
(1981), Hakimi (1983, 1986) and Bauer et al. (1993). However, these papers focus more 
on the entry/location decision, but do not specify a post entry/location game. Research 
that considers a post entry/location game can be further classified into two sub-categories 
when considering the types of player strategies:  location models with Bertrand 
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competition and those with Cournot competition. Most of papers on location theory deal 
with models where firms compete on price.  The conclusion in these papers is generally 
unanimous: firms never agglomerate in a location-price game, as explained in Lederer 
and Thisse (1990). The finding on equilibrium location is explained as coincident 
locations of firms offering homogenous goods will intensify price competition and drive 
profits to zero for all players. Each firm only can maintain a positive profit by choosing a 
separate location.  
  A relatively smaller body of literature deals with location choice under the 
Cournot competition spatial model. Weskamp (1989) establishes the existence of Cournot 
equilibrium with exogenously fixed firm locations in a network setup. Labbe and Hakimi 
(1991) present a duopoly model where firms make location and quantity decisions along 
a network connected by spatially separated markets. Examples of such markets include 
large urban centers connected by highways. In a duopoly with linear demand, Labbe and 
Hakimi (1991) show that under reasonable assumptions there exists a Subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Sarkar et al (1997), a Cournot oligopoly model with n>=2 
firms is studied where firms may set up multiple facilities along the network and the 
demand functions may be nonlinear. As a result, Sarkar et al have shown that both 
agglomeration and non-agglomeration are consistent with Cournot competition, and 
proves that when demand is linear in each market there exist Nash location equilibria.  
This paper focuses on a multiple entrant Cournot location competition model like 
Sarkar et al. As a point of difference from past literature, the model here has no 
restriction on number of entrants (free entry) for the first stage entry/location game. 
Furthermore, it extends the analysis to a sequential two-stage game that integrates the 
element of incumbent/entrant game for the second period. Knowing the identical game 
will occur again, firms not only face the choice of whether to enter or not in the first 
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period, but also the choice to wait for next period and the assess the possibility of a first 
mover advantage.  Like in the past literature, a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 






Note: Green boxes highlights the features of the current model in this paper. Red font 
features are unique in this current paper compared to the past literature. 
Figure 11: A Taxonomy of Spatial Competition Mode 
Careful assessments and considerations are made in this paper to keep its 
theoretical path as close to its industrial applications by explaining the potential market 
values for each example in the context of today's North American natural gas market.  
The purpose of this research exercise is not only to explore academic interest on location 
model competition, but also to create a simplified market model mirroring key 
























market insight. Hence, this paper also includes sections to cover the industrial 
background and constantly highlight examples related to the market source throughout 
the discussion. This research intends to set an example to bring the market analysis work 
and academic research closer together. 
2.3 INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 
2.3.1 What is LNG? 
The challenge of the natural gas market at the global level is not with the supply 
of natural gas. In fact, analysts predict there are vast amounts of natural gas waiting to be 
tapped.  Based on the U.S. Energy Information Agency’s annual report, there are more 
than 6000 trillion cubic feet of gas reserve in the world as of the beginning of 2008, 
which is accessible with current technology. Compare that to the total annual natural gas 
consumption for North America which is about 29 trillion cubic feet, and about 100-105 
trillion cubic feet for the entire world. The real problem is, geographically:  the energy 
demand and supply do not perfectly line up. In other words, gas reserves are not always 
located where they are consumed. For example Japan, a major high-demand energy 
market requiring 3.1 trillion cubic feet natural gas every year, barely produces any gas or 
oil domestically. Japan relies heavily on imports of oil and gas.   
Figure 12 shows the balance of demand and supply of natural gas by continental 
market. On the left panel, the green bars show the natural gas reserves for each 
continental market: Africa, Middle East and Eurasia have more than 80% of the world’s 
gas reserves.  On the right panel, each market’s gas production and consumption is 
shown. Markets which have less gas production than it consumes require extra imports of 
natural gas to meet its demand. Europe, North America and Asia combined make up 
more than 60% of the global gas consumption. When highlighting the top three gas 
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reserve regions and the top three gas consumption markets, it is clear that there is a 
geographic imbalance of gas supply and demand. One solution to the problem is to 
transport natural gas from one continental market to another, and that is where Liquefied 
natural gas or LNG comes in the picture. LNG is natural gas (predominantly methane, 
CH4) that has been converted into liquid form. Liquefied natural gas takes up about 
1/600th the volume of natural gas in the gaseous state, so it is convenient for long 
distance shipping from remote supply areas to markets. A majority of the world's LNG 
supply comes from countries with abundant natural gas reserves. These countries include 
Algeria, Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. There are 60 LNG receiving terminals located worldwide. These 
LNG importers include Japan, South Korea, the United State and a number of European 
Counties.  
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There is  geographic imbalance for gas demand and supply. 
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2.3.2 The LNG Game 
As LNG plays an increasingly important role in the global energy market, it is 
crucial to understand the game of the LNG sector. There are two major types of players: 
countries like Qatar, which owns the natural resources of oil and gas are LNG suppliers. 
The ownership of the natural resource granted the player dominant share of the LNG 
development project. For example, Qatar owns at least a 50% or higher share of every 
LNG liquefaction project developed on its soil. The owner of the resource will seek 
sponsors/partners, usually energy firms, who brings in capital investment and technology 
for the exploration and production.  These sponsors/partners will often manage the 
related downstream operations as well. The commercial development of LNG is a style 
called value chain, which means LNG suppliers first confirm the downstream buyers and 
then sign a long term, 20–25 year, contracts with strict terms and structures for gas 
pricing. Only when the customers are confirmed and the development of a Greenfield 
project is deemed economically feasible can the sponsors of an LNG project invest in 
their development and operation. These energy firms usually are responsible for the 
marketing of LNG on different continents. They are the second type of player in the LNG 
game.  
The upstream infrastructure needed for LNG production and transportation is an 
LNG plant consisting of one or more LNG trains, each of which is an independent unit 
for gas liquefaction. The largest LNG train in operation is now in Qatar. The Qatar gas II 
plant, owned by Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil, has a production capacity of 
7.8 mmtpa for each of its two trains and was inaugurated in April 2009. LNG is loaded 
onto ships and delivered to a regasification terminal. Regasification terminals are usually 
connected to a storage and pipeline distribution network to distribute natural gas to 




Figure 13:  LNG Value Chain 
2.3.3 LNG in the U.S. 
With natural gas consumption exceeding 60,000 mmcfd (Million metric cubic feet 
per day) and accounting for over a fifth of global demand, the U.S. is by far the largest 
and most developed natural gas market in the world. The U.S. is also the largest gas 
producer in the world. Although most of the 16% of natural gas we consume in the U.S. 
is delivered by pipeline from Canada, there is a growing volume of natural gas coming to 
the U.S. in liquid form from overseas. Following stable growth in gas demand of around 
2% per annum through the 1990s, stagnant and declining production has led to price 
increase in year 2000-2007, as shown in Figure 14, and it was widely believed that 
imported liquefied natural gas would be filling up the gap between domestic supply and 
demand in the U.S.. As a result, there was a very active phase of investment on LNG 
related projects including major energy companies racing to invest heavily on 
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liquefactions projects in overseas and to build regasification terminals to receive imports 
along U.S. coastline.  
 
Source: EIA (Energy Information Agency) 
Figure 14: Historical US Gas Consumption and Dry Production 
The U.S. has the largest and most developed gas pipeline network in the world; 
the imported LNG enters the pipeline grid and flow to the demand areas. There are eight 
existing regasification terminals located on the East and Gulf coasts. In addition the US 
has indirect access to regasification capacity on the West Coast via the Coast Azul 
terminal in the Northern Baja California which was commissioned in 2008. Figure 15 
shows the existing and proposed LNG regasification projects on the east coast of the U.S. 












































































































Historical US Gas Consumption and Dry Production 
Unit: Tcf




Source: EIA and FERC;  
Green circles: Proposing Projects; Yellow circles: existing projects 
Figure 15: Map of Existing and Proposed LNG Regasification Terminals in the U.S. 
2.4 MODEL SETUP 
This paper focuses on the siting decisions for liquefied natural gas regasification 
terminals by energy companies in the North American market. The companies select a 
location for the terminal to receive their LNG cargo. Next they deliver natural gas into 
different markets for end-users or trading partners through pipelines. They compete in 
markets (one or many) through delivered quantities considering transportation cost and 
active competitors in the market. The price in each market is determined by the market 
conditions and the total quantity supplied by all participating companies. This is called 
Cournot competition in Economics. It is an accurate depiction of the natural gas market.  
 
 56 
2.4.1 Baseline Model 
The baseline model is a simple one-period game which describes a two-stage non-
cooperative game among multiple players (can be more than 2). In the first stage of the 
game, firms make a simultaneous decision about where to locate a regasification facility 
along the coastline of North America.  In the second stage of the game, firms decide on a 
contracted quantity to be delivered to these facilities and how much to supply to each 
market. The assumption is that all firms choose the location-strategy simultaneously 
without knowledge of the strategy chosen by the other firms.  This is a simplified version 
compared to what occurs in reality, but the scenario is still valid. Although firms usually 
announce their plan to develop regasification terminals and the approved dates of 
proposals on these projects are also published by FERC, those dates are not necessarily 
good indicators of time sequences of entry decisions among participating firms. First, the 
time lag from the announcement of one LNG terminal to the online date is usually at least 
two to three years.  Uncertainties around the environmental regulatory approval process 
and firm financial investment flows can easily derail the process. Second, it is common 
for proposed projects to drop out of the development process.  Public announcement and 
FERC approvals for projects may be more of a strategic signaling tool among participants 
rather than an actual decision point.   
The model on quantity decisions and location choice is described by the following 
notation:  Firms are denoted by an index i∈N = {1, . . . , n} and markets are denoted by an 
index h ∈M = {1, . . . , m}, each demands a quantity of the commodity, i.e., natural gas, 
depending on its settled market price. The demand is fulfilled by the supply of a quantity 
ihQ from the facility of firm i to market h.  Instead of using the traditional hotelling 
location model assumption of continuous market space, this model assumes the existence 
of a finite number of markets which resembles geographically defined major 
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metropolitan areas. The firms will choose one of the five markets to be the location of the 
regasification facility. The location of a market here is not the exact location of one 
specific terminal, but the location of the nearest market area to the terminal and there are 
no physical limits to number of terminals located near one market hub. An example is the 
cluster of regasification terminals in the Gulf of Mexico along the coastline of Texas and 
Louisiana. These terminals are considered to be located in the same market node. They 
may enter the pipeline network from different points, but they are serving one broad 
common market area.  All terminals price their services and tariffs based one common or 
similar market price point. Each supply firm can open one facility at only one of the 
locations. This is a simplification of the reality, because companies can and actually have 
invested in multiple regasification terminals. For example, Shell has the Cove Point 
terminal and the Elba Island terminal.  Conoco Phillips also has regasification access to 
the Freeport and Golden Pass terminals.   
The market space is formalized as follows. Let  ,G V E be an undirected graph 
with V and E as its sets of nodes and edges, respectively, V m . Given two nodes, 
, , ( , )i j i jv v V d v v   is the length of a shortest (with respect to the sum of edge lengths) 
path on G connecting iv  and jv  . There are m markets located each at one node on the 
network; there are n firms that open a facility each at one node. Let 
1   { ,  . . . ,  } i mx V v v  be the location decision by firm i on the network. The quantity 











































The price ( ) at market  is assumed to follow a simple linear function here: 
( ) max{0, }, 0 with price parameters 0, 0. 
h h
h h h h h h h h
p q h
p q q q         
In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the locations of their facilities, 
, 1...ix i n , In the second stage, depending on the location decisions ix , firms choose 
quantities ihQ to be supplied to markets, which results in the quantity decision matrix Q
.The profit firm i wants to maximize is denoted by ( , )i ix Q . A strategy for firm i at 
market h , [ , ]i ihx Q , comprises of a choice of ix for stage 1 and a choice of  ihQ  for stage 
2; a strategy [ , ]i ix Q  , for all markets, where iQ   denotes the row vector of the full 
quantity matrix.  
The game is solved backwards. First, firm i optimally chooses the vector of 
quantities 1( ,..., )i i imQ Q Q  , based on what others competitors deliver and depending on 
the chosen location ix : 
Eqn31: 
* *









After determining the optimal quantity supplied for each market given location choice, 
then going back to the first stage, where firm i  chooses a location strategy *ix  such that: 
Eqn32: 




x x Q X
 
The key drivers of difference in the behaviors among firms are their cost 
structures. There are three types of costs for a firm:  
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 Opening cost 
 Transportation cost  
 Supply cost including shipping cost and regasification cost plus operation cost of 
facility 
The cost of establishing a facility by firm i at is  which is 
geographically specific. Given the availability of existing infrastructure and local 
regulatory status, the cost of constructing a regasification terminal can vary significantly. 
The location  of the facility of firm  also determines its marginal production cost 
. In addition, when LNG is received at the terminal and converted back to its 
gaseous state, firms have to transport the gas to markets, which includes the 
transportation cost: the unit transportation cost between the location of the facility of 
firm i and location  of market h, is represented by , where T is 
increasing and concave in the distance. In order to capture additional competition impact 
for these terminals, transportation cost premium is added for firms transporting gas to or 
passing through a market, which already has its own LNG terminals. Take for example, if 
firm A decides to deliver to the largest market node which is located on the other end of 
the network and firm B’s terminal is located between A’s terminal and the market. Firm 
A will have to pay a unit transportation cost to deliver to market, in addition to a 





Figure 16: Demonstration of Competition Premium on the Network 
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The transportation cost for firm 1 to deliver gas from Terminal A to Market 3 is:  
Eqn33: 13 1 2 2 3( ( , )) * ( ( , ))t T d v v T d v v   
where there is an extra cost for passing by the other competitors, when  >1.  
The exact variable cost of receiving LNG of each firm is usually confidential to 
the public. It includes two parts: first is the price that the firm pays at the regasification 
terminal to receive the cargo. The second part of the variable cost is the regasification 
cost once the gas is received at the terminal.  Both types of costs are represented together 
as a supply cost, ( )i ic x . The total cost of the location and supply decision of firm  i  is 
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Profit is denoted by i and defined as 
Eqn35: 
1
( , ) ( ) ( , )
m
i i h h ih i i i
h





Firms determine quantities for the markets to maximize profit. Substituting the inversed 
demand relation of the market into the profit function gives: 
Eqn36: 
1 1
( , ) max ,0 ( , )
m n
i i h h jh ih i i i
h j
x Q Q Q TC x Q   
 
 
   
 





Theorem 1: Nash equilibrium quantities shipped by firm i to market h follow from the 

























To solve for the exact quantities delivered to each market, we introduce the concept of 
hA and hA , the set of firms delivering to market h, and the firms not delivering to h 
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For example, there are 5 markets that the firms can choose to serve and locate the 
regasification terminals.  
 
First stage: There are two firms and firms simultaneously choose locations xi 
 




Second Stage: Firms simultaneously choose quantity supplied to each markets 








Let hA be the set of firms which supply market h, | |hA k . The positive equilibrium 
quantities are given by:  
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ihQ depends on production and transportation cost of the active suppliers in market h.   
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which means that higher average marginal cost and transportation costs decreases the 
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Optimal prices at each market rise with average marginal cost and transportation 
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At equilibrium * 0ih hQ for i A  , 
*( ) / 0h ih hp TCu   such that 
*
h ihp TCu . 
Proposition 2 
The relation between the firm with the highest total unit costs in the active set, hi A ,  



















Firms are ordered on the basis of total unit costs and they will only enter the 
market if the market clearing price covers their variable cost, which is the total unit cost 
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The final payoff for each firm given location vector X is:  
Eqn46:   
    
 
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Now return to the first stage, considering the equilibrium supply quantity in the second 
stage, each firm maximizes the profit function by selecting a location on the network, 
which has the highest optimal profit. The strategy 
* * *
1( ,... )nX x x  is a Nash Equilibrium if 
for each firm i, 
*
ix is the best response to the strategies specified by the n-1 other firms:  
Eqn47:    
* * * * * * *
1, ( ) ( ) ( ,..., ,..., )i i i i i n ix Q X x Q X with X x x x x   
 
 









2.4.2 Sequential Game 
Based on the results from one single period model, this section extends the game 
to a total of two periods. Firms have the choice to choose a location considering the 
current market conditions or postpone the decision to the next period. The market 
conditions are unknown to firms and will only be revealed at the beginning of each stage. 
Here, the concept of stage can be thought of as each regime change in the market. It is not 
constrained to a regular time period such as a month or a year. Instead, it can be thought 
of as a reasonably stable period of time in the market, where firms are confident about the 
foreseeable future. In a natural gas market, this can be a medium term of 2-4 years for a 
firm which is considering a business development project like a regasification terminal.  
Without repeating the formulas and calculations for the extended model, the 
description for the baseline model in the previous section can serve as a detailed base for 
the discussion here.  Several additional parameters are introduced for the extended model.   
At T =1, the current market conditions in each market are revealed to the firms:  




















Firm i has an expectation of the future market in the second period, which is based on  
firm’s current knowledge of the future, denoted as 
i and the observed market condition 
in current period :  
Eqn50: 
     
2
2 2 2 1
1 1 1
( , , ) | , 1
,... , ,... , ,... ( , , ) ,
T
i
T T T T
m m m i
Exp w T
Exp w w w
  
      

   




The firms competing for regasification terminals locations are all sophisticated players 
and possess comprehensive market information and knowledge.  It is reasonable to 
assume that the firms are forward looking. Firms consider the expected outcome for next 
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market regime when determining the current location choice.  In this paper, all firms are 
assumed to have the same expectation of the future at the location selection time. This is 
reasonable for energy industry, as firms all have strong analytical teams and all have 
access to a few pioneering consulting firms and forecasting services. Although firms have 
varying modified views on many different aspects of the market, they usually come to a 
consensus in the industry about the general market direction.  
With the introduction of multiple periods, there are additional value adjustments 
for the opening cost of each market, denoted as 
h . When h >1, it represents the 
crowding-out effect whereby the opening cost for new entrants are higher when there are  
incumbent firms already in the market. This can be considered as an additional entry 
barrier. When 
h <1, it represents the learning benefit for the later entrants, where there is 
knowledge sharing of the construction and operation of the facility from the existing 
players. For example, to construct the first LNG regasification terminal, some challenges 
may include getting approval from local government and acceptance from the 
community. However, as a result of the first terminal, the second entrant can enjoy the 
established regulatory policies which were initiated by the previous terminal investor.  
Since the future market conditions are unknown, firms have to decide whether or 
not to enter based on current market conditions and expectations of future market 
conditions. At first period of the sequential game, firms do not only consider location 
choices in current period, but also in the next period. Given the location choices of both 
periods, firms will estimate the expected profit for both periods. The decisions of 
accessing and delivering to each market are the same here as in the baseline model. Firms 




First, solve the first period. When T = 1, the game is solved backwards like the 
baseline model. Based on current observations and expectations, firms first optimally 
choose the vectors of quantities for both periods given a location choice:   
Eqn51: 




Q x Q X

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X =  1 2 1, ( ( , , ) , )T T T iX Exp X w      
After determining the optimal quantity supplied for each market given location choice, go 
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 is the discount factor for the future. Note if discount factor is zero, firms are not 
forward looking and only able to observe the current market condition, the equilibrium 
result for the first stage of the siting game should be the same as the equilibrium resulted 
from the baseline model.  
In order to accommodate the fact that firms can choose to enter any time in the 
reality for investing a LNG terminal, this model also allows second chance of entry: in 
second period, when nature reveals the market condition, firms that have not yet have 
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chosen a location will be given a second chance to choose. Firms that have chosen are not 
given a chance to relocate. Once location choices are made, firms will again 
simultaneously choose the quantity supplied to each market. The game in the second 
stage is solved like the baseline model, except certain firms’ location choices are pre-
determined as they have chosen already. If there are still firms left without making a 
location choice from the first stage, that firm (or those firms) will have a second chance 
here.  Firms will only enter the market whenever the market conditions in the future 
stages are revealed to be profitable. If the market conditions did not improve to be 
profitable for firms which have not chosen, these firms will never enter, as they did not at 
the previous stage.  As firms make entry decisions depending on their cost structure of 
producing or delivering gas, more efficient players with lower costs will enter the market 
first, while others will wait until the conditions become more profitable for entering. 
In reality the firms play the quantity game respectively, and it is possible to 
introduce a multi-stage cournot quantity game here. If the focus is not the specific 
quantity offered, but the location decision: the gain of a multi-stage quantity game is 
assessed at the beginning of every period based on firms’ expectations. Multi-stage 
quantity game can be rewritten as one constant term in the formula given firm’s 
expectation as follows, which demonstrates that one stage quantity game is sufficient to 
illustrate the purpose:  





















2.5 SIMULATION RESULTS AND NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
The reality only shows one story, which results from orchestrating through many 
fundamental drivers in the market place. It is challenging to understand the intricacy of 
all drivers at once. The purpose of this model is to exploit the dynamics observed in the 
LNG market, by providing a simplified virtual space where the researcher is able to gain 
a better understanding of how each variable works. Hence, the following section focuses 
on: 1) building a stylized scenario which mirrors industrial facts and data, and designed 
to simulate reality-based market behaviors; 2) introduce more model simulations to 
investigate the impacts of a particular market fundamental driver at a specific instance of 
time. 
A simple algorithm is introduced here: first, the equilibrium quantities are 
computed for each possible location possibility. Afterwards, a Nash Equilibrium Location 
is chosen among all possible locations by checking whether it is better for a firm to 
relocate its facility given everything else remaining constant. For the extended model, the 
same method is used, except there are more location combinations to calculate as both 
periods are considered when T =1. 
2.5.1 Stylized Baseline Scenario 
The values of parameters in the stylized scenario are determined based on 
industrial facts. The following section discusses the methodology and data used to derive 
the stylized model simulation.  
2.5.1.1 Network of Markets 
A network of markets is defined as market areas located along the east coast of 
the United States, connected by natural gas pipelines. Figure 18 is the same map of US 
regasification terminals (East coast) overlaid with five market centers defined by 
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clustering neighboring terminals based on the major demand centers along the coast line. 
For simplicity, the markets used in this model simulation are defined by major gas market 
hubs along the coastline, which are aggregated market place for natural gas deliveries and 
receipts. These market centers are connected by a well-defined transportation corridor, 
comprise of major pipelines as well as local and smaller pipelines, extending from Gulf 
of Mexico to major demand areas into the northeastern US, tapping supply regions in the 
Gulf of Mexico, Texas, Appalachia, and Canada and serving gas to markets across the 
Midwest and mid-Atlantic regions, including major metropolitan centers. Because these 
five markets are also located in five adjacent census regions,  they are referred to as either 
markets 1 to 5, or  by the names of the census regions: the South West Central (SWC), 





Figure 18: Map of Market Centers 
2.5.1.2 Costs of Transportation 
There are several options of getting from one market to another on the network 
via pipelines and many possible long-term contracts can be negotiated.  However,  the 
gas pipeline network is effective and liquid enough that the transportation costs between 
two markets are fairly consistent and close in range, it can be partially reflected by price 
differences between two markets. There is little concern that the contracted cost of 
transportation for LNG cargos is much different from the market rates. LNG cargos are 
usually considered and priced at the ongoing market rate when the LNG marketers decide 
on its quantity offered to a market.4 Therefore, the transportation rate from one market to 
another is determined by a combination of tariff rates posted by major pipelines between 
markets 
                                                 
4LNG supply to the U.S. market has not been completely responsive to the market price in the U.S., and the supply constrains of LNG 
is out of the scope of this paper.  
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2.5.1.3 Definition of Demand Function 
There are two parameters that need to be identified for each market’s demand, 
given the linear demand assumption: 𝛼ℎand 𝛽ℎ . 𝛼ℎ is a measure of the maximum price in 
the market where the quantity offered is zero, and 𝛽ℎ is a measure of price elasticity of 
demand.  Since there are other sources of natural gas supply in the market besides LNG 
imports, 𝛼ℎshould be the marginal gas price in the market.  As a result, LNG marketers 
use the marginal market price as an indication of the ex-ante market price before any 
introduction of LNG. 𝛽ℎ  is the change in market price when incremental LNG import is 
supplied to the market area. Figure 19 shows the gas consumption, and production 
available for each market. The more demand there is, the higher the marginal gas price. 
On the other hand, the more local production there is, the lower the marginal gas price. 
The LNG players consider the balance between demand and supply in each market to 
determine the marginal gas price for the incremental LNG. Market 1, South West Central, 
represents the largest market in term of size, while there is more local gas production 
compared to local gas consumption in this area. Hence that leads to the fact the market 
price of gas observe in Market 1 is the cheapest out of the five markets. On the other 
hand, Market 4 and 5 are markets with little local production. Since gas is widely used for 
space heating in the Northeast, market 4 and 5 have little price elasticity in the winter. 
2.5.1.4 Shipping Cost of LNG 
Each LNG facility may have a different shipping cost schedule from each origin 
which is a result of specific negotiation with the LNG liquefaction project. Table 3 lists 
the average shipping costs to each major market area using the representative LNG 
regasification terminal in each area. There can be more variation of the rate, but it is not a 
consideration in the current model. For simplicity, the average of the shipping cost 
received in each representative LNG regasification terminal is used.  
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2.5.1.5 Construction Costs and Operation Costs 
Construction costs are available from EIA and FERC announcements for selected 
terminals. An average of construction costs for each market area is used as part of the 
model. Since the quantity and price data is grouped as daily or monthly, the construction 
costs are recalculated into daily pay-off plus some reasonable estimate of facility 
operation expenses. It is much more expensive to construct a regasification terminal in 
northeast markets, due to the dense population and clustered metropolitan areas. Hence, 
the construction costs are higher in Markets 4 and 5 compared to Market 1, 2 and 3, due 
to additional regulatory and environmental challenges encountered when the location is 
In close proximity to major metropolitan areas. 
2.5.1.6 Number of players 
There are a handful of LNG players in the market, and the model simulates the 
number of players from two to four for demonstration purposes.  
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Representative LNG Shipping Rates: 




England South Atlantic South West Central 
South East 
Central 
Exporter / Regasification 
Terminals EVERETT 
COVE 




Algeria 0.52 0.57 0.6 0.72 
Nigeria 0.8 0.83 0.84 0.93 
Norway 0.56 0.61 0.64 0.77 
Venezuela 0.34 0.33 0.3 0.35 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.38 
Qatar 1.37 1.43 1.46 1.58 
Australia 1.76 1.82 1.84 1.84 
Average 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.94 
Source: The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Markets: Status and Outlook 2003 by EIA 
Table 3: Representative LNG Shipping Rates 
2.5.1.7 Model Result and comments 
Table 4 includes the model parameters used for the baseline scenario. All the 
values of parameters are based on industrial facts and experience. The baseline scenario 
is designed to be a close reflection of real market in a simplified setup. Table 5 
summarizes the model results, in term of equilibrium numbers and equilibrium locations, 




 Market Parameters ($)     
Market   Alpha  Beta   Initial Capital Cost   
South West Central 4.5 0.005 10000   
South East Central 5 0.02 10000   
South Atlanta 5.5 0.05 15000   
Middle Atlanta 7.8 0.1 45000   
New England 7.9 0.05 30000   
Tariff Matrix ($/Dth)      
Market  South West Central South East Central South Atlanta Middle Atlanta New England 
South West Central 0.00 0.30 0.60 1.30 1.75 
South East Central 0.30 0.00 0.30 1.00 1.45 
South Atlanta 0.60 0.30 0.00 0.70 1.15 
Middle Atlanta 1.30 1.00 0.70 0.00 0.45 
New England 1.75 1.45 1.15 0.45 0.00 
Firm Cost Structure Matrix  ($)     
Cost of Gas South West Central South East Central South Atlanta Middle Atlanta New England 
Firm 1 3.9 3.9 3.85 3.8 3.8 
Firm 2 3.9 3.9 3.85 3.8 3.8 
Firm 3 3.9 3.9 3.85 3.8 3.8 
Firm 4 3.9 3.9 3.85 3.8 3.8 
Table 4: Model parameters 
Number of Players 
 Two Players Three Players Four Players 
Number of Equilibrium 1 3 12 
Equilibrium Locations 1      1      1     1     4      1     1     4     5 
       1     4     1      1     1     5     4 
i.e. (x1, x2, x3, x4); Where x1 – is the location chosen by firm 1.        4     1     1      1     4     1     5 
        1     4     5     1 
        1     5     1     4 
        1     5     4     1 
        4     1     1     5 
     4     1     5     1 
     4     5     1     1 
          5     1     1     4 
Market Locations: 
1: South West Central; 2: South East Central; 3: South Atlanta; 4: Middle Atlanta; 5: New England 
Table 5: Model Result for baseline scenario 
This stylized baseline scenario leads to some interesting results, which are 
incredibly similar to real world trends, even in a simplified model setup.  When there are 
only two players in the market, the first choices is marked location 1, which is the South 
West Central – Texas part of the Gulf of Mexico. As the number of players grows, the 
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location choices are expanded to Middle Atlanta and New England. That is a very 
realistic result. Market 1 is attractive with its low construction cost, and large liquid 
market, which makes it easy to transport gas to the Northeast market. Market 4 and 5 are 
attractive as they are both demand centers, but they both are expensive locations for 
building a terminal. As the number of players increases, even though they all have 
identical cost structure in the baseline scenario, the equilibrium choices indicate that 
firms choose to avoid additional competition and not all locate in the same markets. 
When the number of players is equal or larger than three, the players start to separate 
from each other, if possible. Table 6 shows the supply choices made by LNG players for 
each market in the second stage after deciding on the location of the facility. The supply 
choices reveal further the intention of location strategy – each LNG player chooses 
different markets as their focus, which reduces the competition among each other. 
 
Number of Players  = 2 
   Supply Choices     
       Firm 1 Loc: 1       40.000      13.333       6.667       8.667      15.000 
Firm 2 Loc: 1       40.000      13.333       6.667       8.667      15.000 
   Total     
        80.000      26.667      13.333      17.333      30.000 
       Number of Players  = 3 
  Supply Choices     
Firm 1 Loc: 1       40.000      13.333       5.000       3.000       4.250 
Firm 2 Loc: 1       40.000      13.333       5.000       3.000       4.250 
Firm 3 Loc: 4        0.000       0.000       5.000      17.000      32.250 
   Total     
        80.000      26.667      15.000      23.000      40.750 
       Number of Players  = 4 
  Supply Choices     
Firm 1 Loc: 1       40.000      13.333       5.000       0.500       0.000 
Firm 2 Loc: 1       40.000      13.333       5.000       0.500       0.000 
Firm 3 Loc: 4        0.000       0.000       5.000      14.500      21.333 
Firm 4 Loc: 5        0.000       0.0000.000      10.000      30.333 
   Total     
        80.000      26.667      15.000      25.500      51.667 
 
 78 
Table 6: Baseline Model Result of Supply Choices
5
 
In reality, most of LNG facilities (existing and proposed) are located near the Gulf 
of Mexico (Market 1 and part of Market 2), while a few are located in Middle Atlanta and 
New England area (Market 4 and 5). There is only one regasification terminal located in 
South Atlanta (Market 3) – Elba Island terminal. This is close to what the baseline 
scenario has generated. That confirms the validity of the LNG game as a robust 
simulation of the actual strategic decisions made in locating these regasification terminals 
in the U.S. market.  
2.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
The advantage of modeling is the ability to measure the impact of specific market 
drivers, and simulate alternate scenarios, which may occur in reality. That is the focus of 
this section: by varying certain parameters of the model, the results reveal more 
meaningful variations in equilibrium location and supply choices by LNG players in the 
game. 
2.5.2.1 Varying Transportation Tariff and Network Connectivity 
Although LNG terminals are constrained to locations along the coastline for 
receiving cargos, gas from each terminal has to first be transported onto these pipelines 
for delivery to major market areas. There is capacity limitation on a pipeline, and the cost 
of transportation increases dramatically when the utilization rate of a pipeline approaches 
its capacity limit. When the pipeline network is relatively full, it is much more expensive 
to deliver the gas to the market. With the development of unconventional gas production 
newly found in Texas and Louisiana, there is an increasing challenge for the 
                                                 




displacement of LNG supplies in the future. Transportation cost is certainly a concern for 
firms when choosing the location of a regasification terminal. Scenario 1 investigates the 
effect of transportation tariff on firms’ location choices, deviating from the assumptions 
of the baseline scenario. Two sets of sensitivity simulations are illustrated here, 
considering the effect of the transportation tariff:  
Uniformed Change of Tariff Structure:  
This is the case where all tariff structure are adjusted up or down uniformly by the 
same scale. In reality, that is likely to happen through a “rate case” applied by a pipeline 
company. When a pipeline company seeks a higher return on investment, due to market 
condition or economic condition, it can submit an application for a “rate case” to FERC 
for approval. The degree to which these rate case changes is usually uncertain to the 
shippers on the pipeline until the rate case is approved by FERC.  The rate changes range 
from moderate such as a nickel up to 20-30 cents.  For this reason, rate changes are 
always a risk for shippers on a pipeline.  
The sensitivity simulation adjusts the entire transportation tariff structure up or 
down uniformly and the results are shown in Table 7. In this scenario, the model 
simulates different sets of tariff structure under a common adjustment factor, which 
ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 with 0.1 increments, of the original tariff in the baseline scenario. 
As the tariff structure moves from low to high, the location choices of regasification 
terminals in equilibrium change from a central agglomeration for all players to a repelled 
separation on each end of the network. That implies that as the transportation tariff 
becomes a larger part of the cost function, the need to avoid competition drives LNG 
players to locate further apart.  
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Relative Change of Tariff Structure: 
This sensitivity simulation also investigates another scenario regarding tariff 
structure.  As mentioned earlier, the congestion on the pipelines causes higher tariffs for 
certain market segments. This is represented by uneven increments of tariff from market 
to market: for example, the incremental tariff change is highest from Market 3 to Market 
4, in the baseline scenario. This simulation firstly considers a hypothetical tariff structure, 
where there is no bottleneck on the pipeline, and all the increments of tariff change from 
market to market are the same, 30 cents. That is unlikely in the real market, as resolving 
bottlenecks on the transportation networks requires new pipelines or expansion of 
existing pipeline. These projects are challenging and expensive, because the congestion 
zones on the pipeline network are usually near major metropolitan areas.  As a point of 
reference, there have not been any successful projects to develop long haul pipelines 
through populated markets, such as the Middle Atlanta area, for the past 3-4 decades. 
Therefore, this simulation of tariff changes ran under two existing tariff setting: 
symmetric tariff structure with even tariff increments versus one with uneven tariff 
increments.  
The results demonstrate that as the tariff level increases, the equilibrium location 
also tends to move from a centralized location to a scatter pattern. The even tariff 
structure encourages more separation of locations, compared to the previous simulation 
where there exists more expensive and congested market segments. It is noteworthy that 
when the congestion is cleared on the network, market 3 becomes more attractive as a 
equilibrium location choice, compared to the baseline scenario: the Elba Island terminal 
is located in market 3, South Atlanta area.   The Elba Island Terminal has faced 
challenges in the past of marketing LNG import gas from that area to the Northeast due to 
the high transportation premium that is added to the cost of LNG from market 3.  While it 
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does not have the advantage of a liquid market, its local market is rather limited and extra 
LNG imports into Market 3 would have faced challenges to be priced fairly, compared to 
its competitions which import  LNG from the Gulf of Mexico (Market 1 or 2).  
 
Note:  
1. Colored block indicated a chosen location for terminals – there can be multiple 
terminals located in one market. There are also multiple equilibriums for each 
simulation case. 
2. Green colored row is the location choices appeared in the baseline scenario.  
  Uneven tariff increments   Even tariff increments   
Adjustment 
Factor/ 
Markets 1 2 3 4 5 
 
1 2 3 4 5   
0.50 4 




   
    
0.60 4 




   






















    
0.90 2 
  
























1   
1.20 2 





1 1 1   
1.30 2 





1 1 1   
1.40 2 





1 1 1   
1.50 2    2  1  1 1 1   
Note: The number of in the market location indicates the maximum of firms chosen this 
market. So, it is a measurement for market agglomeration.  
Table 7: Comparison of Equilibrium Locations under Even/Uneven Tariff 
Increments on Network 
2.5.2.2 Varying Price Responsiveness in Markets 
Price responsiveness in the market changes when the economic conditions 
change. When there is strong demand, there is plenty of liquidity in the market to support 
additional supply of gas and price impact from extra supply is minimal. However, on the 
other hand, in a market with little liquidity, any additional supply can have a significant 
impact on the price in the market. Assume the same network setup as in the baseline 
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scenario and hold all market conditions the same except for the market responsiveness 
measure – beta.  When there is higher price responsiveness in the market in general, the 
competition is more intense. Because there is a greater reduction in market price from 
every additional quantity of gas supplied to the market and firms act more cautiously with 
their supply decisions to markets. When the price impact is softer, firms produce 
significantly more.  
The baseline scenario shows that the market responsiveness increases in the value 
of Beta from Market 1 to Market 4. This section provides two alternative sets of 
simulations of market responsiveness compared to the baseline scenario:  
1. Simulation of a network shares the same market responsiveness for each market. 
Different levels of market responsiveness are tested in this simulation: from a 
very liquid network market to a very inflexible network market. The equilibrium 
location choice is stable when there is homogeneous market liquidity on the 
network – all location choices are centralized at market 4 from all simulated beta 
values. When there is no difference in market responsiveness in price, there is 
little motivation for avoiding competition by locating away from competitors and 
hence the equilibrium choices are all in the demand centers where the marginal 
price is high. Locating in market 1 in the baseline scenario takes advantage of the 
liquid market in the Gulf area, even though that advantage does not exist anymore 
in this simulation.  
2. Simulation of a network with different market responsiveness for each market.  
This is similar to the baseline scenario, but with an improved market liquidity 
condition for markets 2 and 3. Markets 2 and 3 have a relatively less flexible 
market compared to market 1, as the major pipelines in these market areas are 
mainly passing natural gas from Gulf of Mexico to the Northeast markets (Market 
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4 and 5), and have less capacity to receive or delivery on this segment. It is more 
desirable to deliver gas as far north as possible on this corridor.  Markets 2 and 3 
are not a desired destination in term of profitability. So as the liquidity of market 
2 and 3 increases, the beta decreases and the equilibrium location choices move 
from the extreme ends of the market to the middle of the network.  
 
  Equal Price Elasticity among Markets 
Beta 1 2 3 4 5 
0.000   
  
4   
0.005   
  
4   
0.010   
  
4   
0.015   
  
4   
0.020   
  
4   
0.025   
  
4   
0.030   
  
4   
0.035   
  
4   
0.040   
  
4   
0.045   
  
4   
0.050     4   
Table 8: Comparison of Equilibrium Locations when all markets sharing the 
same market responsiveness 
 
          Changing Price Elasticity for Market 2 and 3 
  
   
  1 2 3 4 5 
0.005 0.020 0.050 0.100 0.050 2 
  
1 1 
0.005 0.020 0.045 0.100 0.050 2 
  
1 1 






























0.005 0.010 0.010 0.100 0.050   2 2 
 
  
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.100 0.050     4    
          
Table 9: Comparison of Equilibrium Locations when two markets have varying 
market responsiveness assumptions 
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2.5.2.3 Varying Cost Structures of Firms 
In the baseline scenario, all firms have identical costs specific to one location of 
the market and hence the set of equilibria represents a symmetric set of possibilities of 
location choices: for example in the baseline scenario – 12 combinations for three 
possible locations of 4 players exist. Each player has equal possibilities to choose any of 
the three market locations in equilibrium, market. In reality, firms are not identical. They 
vary significantly in terms of their cost structures.  The relative cost structure of one to 
other firms is a key driver to shape the business strategy of a firm under competition. In 
this section the focus shifts to the cost structures of firms. Instead of being equally 
productive, firms are configured to have different cost structures. Location choices are 
not only determined by the absolute value of shipping costs and regasification charges, 
but even more by the relativity of cost structures among firms.  This section studies two 
sets of scenarios and presents the model results separately as follows:  
Selected firms have absolute cost advantages compared to its competitors in all markets: 
This simulation hypothesizes a subset of firms (one to two), which have lower 
supply costs compared to its competitors. This is likely if one of the players has invested 
in upstream liquefaction operation, compared to its competitors. In that case, that player 
may have special long term contract with LNG suppliers in the global market at a lower 
cost. That is a likely situation in real market: as mentioned in earlier sections, major oil 
companies which have invested in the upstream liquefaction projects have long term 
base-load contract which ensures a minimum delivery of LNG cargo to its designated 
terminals in the U.S. market without diversion rights. Therefore, these contracted cargos 
don’t response to higher price bidders for the load; instead they are obligated to deliver at 
a pre-negotiated rate to a market. Therefore, the variable of cost of LNG supply is lower 
for these major firms, which hold long-term contracts with upstream operation.  
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The configuration is the cost scale between firms. For example, when the cost 
configuration is (1.5, 1, 1, 1), it implies that firm 2 to firm 4 have cost as the default value 
in the baseline scenario, and firm 1 has a higher variable cost than its competitors. As 
firm 1’s variable cost varies from one half of, to 50% more than its rivalries, it is easy to 
note the changes of location choices in the equilibria: when the cost structure among 
firms varies significantly, due to the difference in cost structure, the strategic focus of 
each firms differ.  The most cost-efficient players will focus on choosing the largest 
market area in term of liquidity as the location of its facility and all other less effective 
players are pushed to the other end of the network to avoid competition. As a result, a 
high-cost firm chooses to locate away from firm 1 and concentrate in supplying the 
nearby markets, 4 and 5. There is more market segmentation observed with more sparsely 
distributed cost structure among firms. When the difference of firms cost structure gets 
narrower, competition increases and pulls the equilibrium location choices closer 
together.  
 
 Variable Cost Scale (4 x 1) Firm 1 has a different variable cost Number of 
Equilibriums  Firm1 Firm2 Firm3 Firm4 1 2 3 4 5 
0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 Firm 1 
   
3 1 
0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 Firm 1 
   
3 1 
0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 Firm 1 
   
3 1 
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 Firm 1 
   
3 1 
0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 Firm 1 
   
3 1 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2 
  
1 1 12 
1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 2 
  
1 Firm 1 3  
1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 2 
  
1 Firm 1 3 
1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 2 
  
1 Firm 1 3 
1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1 
   
Firm 1+2 3 
1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1    Firm 1+2 3 
Table 10: Comparison of Equilibrium Locations when selected firm has cost 
(dis)advantages compared  
Uniformed change in variable cost structure for all firms: 
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In addition, if there was an external shock to the LNG supplies, how would that 
change the game of location? This is more of a theoretic question than a practical one. 
When all the costs are adjusted downward from the baseline scenario together, all firms 
choose market 1 as the location for terminal. As the cost of opening a facility becomes 
more significant, market 1's fixed costs proportionally decreases. In term of supply 
choices, firms deliver to all markets, however, firms will deliver a higher quantity in 
market 1, where the liquidity is highest, and secondly in market 5.  
On the other hand, when all the costs are adjusted upward from the baseline 
scenario together, all firms “migrated” to the other extreme of the network, market 5, 
where fixed cost portion is most expensive. That implies that when there is a significant 
increase in the variable cost, the focus of strategy shifts to locate to a market that 
minimizes the transportation cost and maximize marginal price. Supply choices have also 
shifted from delivering to all markets, to only delivering to market 5 or 4 (only delivery 
to market 4 when the cost scale is less than 1.4), as the variable costs become more 
formidably expensive for all players. Overall, this scenario shows that if the cost of LNG 
becomes relatively more expensive to the U.S. market, the LNG market shrinks quickly 
and this result helps to identify the “last resort” for LNG import, New England market.  
 
 Variable Cost Scale (4 x 1) Uniformed change in costs for All Firms 
Number of 
Equilibriums  Firm1 Firm2 Firm3 Firm4 1 2 3 4 5 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 4 
    
1 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 4 
    
1 
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 4 
    
1 
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 4 
    
1 
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 4 
    
1 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2 
  
1 1 12 
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 2 
   
2 4 
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 2 
   
2 4 
1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3   
   
4 1 
1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4   
   
4 1 




Table 11: Comparison of Equilibrium Locations under uniformed change in 
variable cost structure: 
2.5.2.4 Market Outlook 
From here onwards, the scenarios extend to the two-period game. Global energy markets 
are changing constantly, and there are even occasional seismic-sized shifts. However, 
with the great challenge of trying to predict a recession, business plans are designed with 
the Business-As-Usual mindset. One important assumption here is that future realization 
aligns with the firms’ expectation. Since firms are making a decision on location choices 
for both periods at beginning of time, if the expectation becomes reality, the firms will 
simply carry out the original plan. This is just a simplification for the purpose of this 
paper, or pure good faith in fundamental forecasting. The focus of interest is to 
understand the impact of forward-looking vision on the location choices at the beginning 
of the first period compared to decisions made when knowing there is no second chance.  
All firms have long-term market outlooks; defined as the expectation of market 
conditions and price movements in the future. For a capital-intensive project like an LNG 
regasification terminal with 30-year LNG contracts, the fundamental market outlook is 
crucial. When there are two periods in the game, firms have incentive to evaluate the 
expected profit given current choice based on their market outlooks. When there is a 
bullish outlook for the economy, there is incentive to enter the market and secure a 
competitive position. Firms will enter even the entry bears a negative profit at beginning. 
However, when there is a pessimistic outlook for the economy, there is a fear to invest. In 
the past five years, there was strong growth in energy market. There were many proposed 
LNG regasification terminals, although only a few were built in the end. At the turn of 
recession, the freeze-up in credit market and softer global demand for energy will deter 
future investments in regasification terminals.  
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This scenario presents an example that different market expectation can change 
firms’ behavior. Suppose that the firms would have known about the recession in 2008-
2009, and would have been able to predict accurately the natural gas price drop to the 
$4.00 level. If the second time period has a much weaker market condition, how would 
this outlook change the location decision made by firms at beginning of period 1?  Table 
12 shows a hypothesized market outlook of market conditions (alpha and beta), based on 
the realized market price after the gas price dropped from the peak to about 4 dollars 
since. As a result, the equilibrium choice changes to only market 5 in both periods, and 
no firms would have entered markets 1 or 4, if this were the market outlook available to 
all LNG players. This reveals an important insight on LNG location strategy: as LNG has 
not grown to a major source of gas supply in the U.S. market, the strategy of LNG siting 
is somewhat risky and vulnerable, as it depends much on the domestic market condition. 
In this simple simulation, if all firms had ex-ante knowledge of the market condition in 
2008-2010, the locations of the LNG regasification terminals along the coastline will be 
more in New England market, rather than clustering around Gulf of Mexico. This echoes 
with the fact that since the natural gas price drops, the number of U.S. market LNG 
cargos into most of the terminals in Gulf of Mexico has sharply declined; even terminals 
under long term contract have not been receiving the “base load”. Most of the cargos 
were diverted to European and Asian markets where gas price is maintained at a higher 
price level by linking directly to crude oil price.  
 
Market Condition and Outlook (T = 1 and T = 2) 
 Market Parameters ($) T = 1  T = 2  
Market   Alpha  Beta   Alpha  Beta   
South West Central 4.5 0.005 3.8 0.01  
South East Central 5 0.02 3.9 0.025  
South Atlanta 5.5 0.05 4.2 0.08  
Middle Atlanta 7.8 0.1 4.5 0.12  
New England 7.9 0.05 4.7 0.08  
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Table 12: Market Parameters for two-period Game 
T = 1 T = 2 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2     1 1         4 
 
Table 13: Comparison of Equilibrium Locations between one and two periods 
models 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
In order to describe the siting game for LNG regasification terminals, this paper 
sets up a competitive location and quantity “a la Cournot” game to study the oligopolistic 
competition between n (≥2) heterogeneous firms. Firms first decide where to locate a 
facility and then decide on how much to supply to all or some of m(>2) spatially 
separated markets from these facilities. Furthermore, the model is also extended into t=2 
periods, where firms decide to enter in the first or second period, which allows forward 
looking vision impact firm’s marginal behavior.  
By designing a stylized baseline model, which reflects industrial facts and 
knowledge, this model is able to capture important market dynamics in natural gas 
market in a simple setting. The simulated model result from the stylized baseline model 
provides insightful comparison to the reality. The equilibrium location choices in the 
baseline model are either in the Texas area on the Gulf of Mexico or in Northeast market 
areas (Mid-Atlantic market and New England). Those are actual locations presumed by 
the industry in reality. All the existing LNG terminals built so far except one are locating 
in the same market areas indicated in the model. The only outliner terminal is located in 
Alabama, and there is evidence of its struggles on securing reasonable margins in the 
market space with its LNG supply.  
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Furthermore, the paper focuses on industry implications by using numerical 
examples to illustrate impacts of parameters on equilibrium locations and quantities. 
These impacts are hard to predict or quantify in reality, but it is possible through stylized 
theoretic model simulations. Through numerical illustration, it implies that market 
fundamental drivers, like market price responsiveness, long term market outlook, and 
transportation tariff changes, which all have material influence on the strategic decision 
of locating regasification terminals. Since the interest of this study is more on the location 
choice. Hence each scenario simulation focuses more on the impact of the fundamental 
driver on equilibrium locations of the terminals. It is interesting to observe gradual 
migration of the location pattern when the variable in study changes from one end of the 
value range to the other. It reveals the sensitivity and responses in term of terminal 
location choices for the LNG players in the market.  
o When there are uneven tariff increments reflecting market congestion on the 
pipeline network, firms tend to locate away from congested zones to avoid paying 
high premium on the transportation, while when there is even tariff increments in 
a hypothetical setting, the equilibrium locations of terminals are more scattered 
along the network as firms put more priority to avoid competition from each 
other.  
o When the market responsiveness of incremental supply is identical, in other 
words, all markets are equally competitive for incremental supply, firms tend to 
choose to all stay in the market with the highest margin and there is central 
agglomeration in the equilibrium choice.  However, the greater difference in 
market responsiveness in incremental supply, the greater separation of location 
choices. That creates two types of approach in choosing locations among players: 
firms go for the highest margin realized in the market, or firms go for the lowest 
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costs. In the stylized model here, the two types of approaches leads the firms to 
locate in two clusters on the network, either near demand centers where the 
marginal price is highest, or near the production area with lowest operation cost 
and liquid market.  
o When there is difference in cost structure, the firm with a significant cost 
advantage tends to “crowd out” its rivalry out of the same market location. That 
firm tends to stay in the market with the largest size, as it optimizes its strategy by 
supplying much more LNG to the market compared to its competitors and it needs 
to be in a market with deep liquidity.  
o Identical cost structure to the firms cannot guarantee centralized of location 
choices in equilibrium.  
o Outlook of the future market can influence the choice of location as well. When 
anticipating a much weaker economy and market in medium and long term, firms 
tend to concentrate to the demand center with the highest margin while 
abandoning other markets, compared to the stylized baseline model. Interesting, 
this is what the natural gas market is experiencing since 2008. The gas price has 
been depressed and the long term outlook of gas has been adjusted down 
repeatedly, the LNG terminals which are located further from the markets have 
been struggling in even getting LNG cargos and many of them have been almost 
empty for months. The only terminals, which make reasonable deliveries, are 
those located near New England market, supplying gas to New York and Boston, 
when there is congestion on the pipe originating from the Gulf of Mexico.  
This paper aims to create synergy between industrial knowledge and academic research. 
Although game theory approach has been common in academic research and a lot of 
other industrial applications, it is refreshing to analyze firm behavior in energy space. 
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This is not only a game theory model, but also a market analysis research closely relates 
to the real market. This is a first step to introducing the game theory approach to market 
analysis work in energy space, and there are many avenues for extension and future 
researches. One related topic of this LNG citing game is the decision of LNG cargo 
delivery: when the LNG cargo leaves its liquefaction facility, it does not always end up in 
its originally contracted destination; instead it may divert to a different location and 
country when there is a higher bid. The diversion of LNG cargos has been usually studied 
as a response to arbitrage of market prices between continents. However, it is interesting 
to look at the diversion decision as a game played by major LNG players in the world, in 
response to market prices and their future outlooks. Because, including in this paper, we 
have been assuming the major energy firms are just price takers in the market. This is 
more realistic in North America market than in European and Asian markets, where the 
LNG diversions usually happen. So, what if the players do have more strategic intentions 
of moving their cargos than just simply responding to market demand. That is another 




Chapter 3: Tying and Exclusion 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the interest in tying arrangements comes from the prominent place that 
tying law has in antitrust law. Tying arrangements have long been suspect in antitrust 
courts due to the intuitive potential that they seem to have for foreclosure. For decades, 
ties have been challenged on some version of a theory that competition in the tied market 
must be reduced, since those who buy both the tied and the tying products are not 
available as customers to single product sellers in the tied market.  
With the early work of Bowman, lawyers and economists gained a better 
understanding of why it is that businesses use ties. He pointed out several roles for tying 
that appear to solve straightforward business problems without involving a foreclosure 
motive at all. For example, in cases where customers have heterogeneous demands for 
the tying product, a tying arrangement can be a means of metering usage and engaging in 
profitable price discrimination. Another example is in quality assurance: by tying service 
and replacement parts to the initial sale of an item (often by means of warranty 
requirements) a seller can ensure that the purchaser does not use incompetent service 
personnel or defective replacement parts.  
None of this, however, provides a way of understanding how tying can foreclose 
competition.  Indeed, the so-called Chicago School of law and economics provided a 
simple demonstration that appeared to show that tying could never foreclose, the famous 
One Monopoly Rent theorem. Briefly, the theorem assumes that there is a monopolist in 
the market for a product called A, which also competes as one of many perfect 
competitors in the market for another product, B. In the A market, all consumers have the 
same willingness to pay for a unit of A; call it vA. Under independent pricing of A and B, 
the monopolist sets the prices of A at vA and prices at marginal cost in the B market. 
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Consumer surplus is limited to what can be earned on the B product, since it is fully 
extracted from A.  
If the monopolist (call it Firm 1) ties the sale of B to the purchase of A, 
consumers still have the option of buying no A and consuming only B. Rationally, Firm 1 
will extract enough consumer surplus to keep consumers just indifferent between buying 
A and B at the tied prices and buying only B, but at a marginal cost price. But this is just 
the situation that held with independent pricing, so Firm 1 has not gained anything by 
tying. This is the result of the 1MR: there is no gain to tying. Hence, if tying is observed, 
it must be for one of the benevolent reasons pointed out by Bowman.  
A series of post-Chicago papers by Whinston (1990), Carabajo (1990) and 
Mathews and Winter (1998) set out conditions under which tying can led to either 
foreclosure of B market competitors or to a reduction in consumer surplus for consumers 
who buy both products. Perhaps the most famous of the three is the paper by Whinston. 
Whinston assumes that the B market is a differentiated products duopoly, and that Firm 1 
is one of the duopolists. For my purposes, Whinston’s man results are the following. 
First, Whinston shows that unless Firm 1 can precommit to a tie, tying is never profitable 
compared to independent pricing. However, if Firm 1 can precommit, it can foreclose 
competition. This would occur because the tie reduces scale for the single product firm 
(call it Firm 2), so that it may not be able to cover fixed costs, therefore either exiting the 
B market or not entering in the first place. The tie would not be profitable, absent exit by 
Firm2. Carabjo et al obtain a similar result in the case where the B market is Cournot. 
Matthews and Winter assume that the B market is perfectly competitive with and without 
the tie. They do not have a result on foreclosure, but are concerned about the consumer 
effects of tying. They showed that if consumer tastes for A and B are stochastically 
positively correlated, then tying can be a way of extracting consumer surplus in the A 
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market that Firm 1 cannot otherwise extract, even with two part tariffs. In their setting, 
tying is profitable. 
My model contains elements of both Whinston and Mathewson and Winter. Like 
Whinston, I assume a duopoly in the B market. Like Mathewson and Winter, I assume 
that there are some consumers of B who also have a strong preference for A; I assume 
this group of consumers to be a fraction θ of the total number of B consumers6.  I assume 
also that the A and B market have independent demands. This is a simplification, but 
deserves a word of comment. Many tying situations involves A and B products that are 
complements, such as a copying machine and ink or paper. Indeed, most of the landmark 
antitrust cases involving tying are of the type’ See for example, A.B.Dick7and Jefferson 
Parish8. However, there are also significant cases in which the tied and tying products 
had independent demands, such as Times-Picayune and Leow’s9.To isolate the pure effect 
of the conditional sale of two product, I will assume that A and B have independent 
demands. 
My goal is to explore some of the issues raised by Whiston regarding pre-
commitment and exclusion due to tying. By using a Hotelling framework, I impose much 
more structure on the problem that does Whiston, who deals with product differentiation 
at a much more general level. I analyze these issues.  
First, what does it mean to say that firm 1 pre-commits to a tie? Does this mean it 
will charge a particular tied price whether or not firm 2 enters? Or does it mean that it 
                                                 
6This is a simplification of the Mathewson and Winter, since I do not assume any stochastic elements at the 
level of individual demands, but it is in the same spirit and gets to the same result if the B market is 
perfectly competitive. 
7Henry v. A.B.Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) 
8Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde.466 U.S. 2 (1984), 
9 See Times-Picayune Pub’g Co. v. United States 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Loew’s, Inc. 371 
U.S. 38 (1962). 
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will charge a tied price if firm 2 enters, but not otherwise? I will refer to the first type as 
“unconditional” pre-commitment and the second as “conditional” pre-commitment.  
Second, will firm 1 choose one of the other type of pre-commitment? Whiston 
(1990) asserts that if firm 1 pre-commits to a tying arrangement, it can cause exit or deter 
entry by firm 2. He does not spell out the conditions under which firm 1 will find optimal 
to pre-commit.  
3.2. MODEL SETUP 
3.2.1. Stage Game 
Consider the markets for two products - A and B. Assume that A and B have 
independent demands.  
In the market of A, there is a monopoly, firm 1. Firm 1 produces A at a marginal 
cost of 𝑐𝐴 per unit, and charges a two part tariff 𝐸𝐴 , 𝑝𝐴 , where 𝐸𝐴 is a per customer entry 
fee in addition to the unit usage price 𝑝𝐴. The market for B is a duopoly – Firm 1 
competes with firm 2 and both firms have the same marginal cost of production,𝑐𝐵. In the 
absence of tying, each firm charges a two part tariff in the B market at  𝐸1, 𝑝1  and 
 𝐸2, 𝑝2  respectively.  
The demand side of market B follows the Hotelling setup: customers are 
heterogeneous, marked by their location, 𝑡 ∈ [0,1], and are uniformly distributed along 
the unit interval. Without loss of generality, Firm 1 is located at point 0, while Firm 2 is 
located at point 1.  For a customer at location t, there is a disutility of 𝑘𝑡 when he 
purchases B from firm 1, and 𝑘(1 − 𝑡) from firm 2, where 𝑘 is the disutility parameter of 
not buying of not buying a product that fits the consumer’s taste perfectly. Consumer 
surplus for B is given by 𝑣𝐵 𝑝  and the demand curve for B satisfies 𝑞𝐵 𝑝 = −𝑣𝐵




Of the unitary population of customers in market B, there is a𝜃 ∈ (0,1]proportion 
that also values A, with a weakly positive utility 𝑣𝐴 𝑝 and demand curve 𝑞𝐴 𝑝 . 
Similarly, customer demand for A is defined as 𝑞𝐴 𝑝 = −𝑣𝐴
′  𝑝 .  
3.2.2. Timing 
The model proceeds in three stages. In stage 1, firm 1 announces whether or not it 
will pre-commit to tying, either in the conditional or unconditional sense as defined 
above. In stage 2, each firm announces whether or not it will enter the B market. In stage 
3, entry occurs and firms price accordingly.  
This is a game of complete information. Hence, when firm 2 decides whether or 
not to enter, it has heard firm 1’s announcement either to pre-commit or not. At the time 
each firm sets its price, it knows if the other will enter.  
3.2.3. Independent Pricing Regime 
3.2.3.1. Third Stage –Profit Maximization 
In the B market, firm 1 and 2 are competing according to the duopoly Hotelling 
model. A customer of type t ∈ [0,1] who purchases B from firm 1 receives utility 
𝑣𝐵(𝑝1) − 𝐸1 − 𝑘𝑡. If he purchases from firm 2, his utility is  𝑣𝐵(𝑝2) − 𝐸2– 𝑘(1 − 𝑡). A 
marginal customer is defined as when he is indifferent between the two firms. This 
customer type is denoted  𝑡0 , and his location is given by: 







 𝑣𝐵 𝑝1 − 𝑣𝐵 𝑝2 − 𝐸1 + 𝐸2  
Firm 1 in market B earns its profit from selling product B to the segment of market zero 
to the marginal customer  𝑡0, given the two part tariff  𝑝1, 𝐸1 : 
Eqn56:  1 1 1 1 0( ) ( )B B Bp c q p E t     
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And firm 2’s in market B is defined by selling product B to the rest of the market from 
marginal customer 𝑡0 to 1: 
Eqn57:   2 2 2 2 01B B( p c )q ( p ) E t      
For market A, given 𝜃portion of customers in B market also values product A. Assuming 
that such customers are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], firm 1’s monopolistic profit under 
independent pricing regime is:    
Eqn58: 𝜋1𝐴 = 𝜃 ∙  (𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) ∙ 𝑞𝐴 𝑝𝐴 + 𝐸𝐴  
Therefore, the goal of firm 1 is to maximize the sum of profits from both market A and 
B: 
Eqn59: 
   1 1 1 0
1 1, , ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
. . ( ) 0
Max A A A A A B B
A A A
A AE p E p
p c q p E p c q p E t
s t v p E
      
 
 
Firm 2 maximizes its B market profits 
 
Eqn60: 
 2 2 2 0
2 2,
( ) ( ) (1 )Max B B
E p
p c q p E t     
 
Theorem 1 
The optimal tariffs for firm 1 and 2 in the B market under independent pricing 
are symmetric and defined as: 
   





firm 1: , ,
firm 2: , ,
B
B
E p k c
E p k c








Eqn61:  0 1 2
1 1 1
( ) ( )
2 2 2
B B B Bt v c E v c E
k
       
The firm 1 gains the maximum profit from each customer in market A as the 
monopoly: 
Eqn62:    
* *, ( ),A A A A AE p v c c  
For the detailed algebra, please refer to the Appendix 1.  
3.2.3.2. The Second Stage- Entry Decision 
The entry decision is determined by the expected equilibrium profits in the last 
stage. From Theorem 1, the third stage Nash equilibrium profits for both firms under 
independent pricing are:  
Eqn63:    1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1




A A A B B B BA A A B A A A
A A










The profit for firm 2 under independent pricing is: 
Eqn64:  2
1
( , ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
2 2
B B B B B
k
c k c c q c k        
Assume that k is large enough here that the profit for both firms are at least as big as the 
sunk entry costs, both firms always choose to enter in the second stage, and play the Nash 
equilibrium outcome in the third stage. Therefore, under independent pricing regime this 




3.2.4. Tied Pricing 
3.2.4.1. Third Stage – Equilibrium Prices 
At the third stage upon entry, under tied pricing, consider the two types of 
customers: the ones who value A, and the others who do not. In the 1-θ share of the 
population which does value A, the marginal customer is defined the same way as in 
independent pricing case, and is denoted 0t : 
Eqn65: 
 
1 1 0 2 2 0
0 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) (1 )
1 1




v p E kt v p E k t
t v p v p E E
k
     
     
 
In the θ share of the population which values A, the marginal customer, denoted 1t , is 
defined as being indifferent between purchasing both A and B from firm 1 and 
purchasing only B from firm 2: 
Eqn66: 
 
1 1 1 2 2 1
1 1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
B A A B
B A A B
v p v p E kt v p E k t
t v p v p v p E E
k
      
      
 
There are two scenarios for customers who purchase from firm 1: one who values both A 
and B and chooses to purchase from firm 1 for both A and B, with market share of 1t  ; 
and others who only value B and still choose to purchase only product B from firm 1, 
with market share of 0(1 )t .  
Hence, the profit for firm 1 is defined under tied pricing: 
Eqn67: 
   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )(1Max A A A A B B B B
Ap E p
p c q p p c q p E t p c q p E t         
 
Similarly, there are two scenarios for customers who purchase from firm 2: ones who 
value both A and B, but choose to give up product A and purchase only B from firm 2, 
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defined as 1(1 )t  ; and others who only value B, and choose to purchase B from firm 2, 
defined as 0(1 ) (1 )t   . So, profit for firm 2 is defined as: 
Eqn68: 
   2 2 2 1 0
2 2,
( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )Max B B
E p
p c q p E t t         
Initially, assume that 
0 1( , ) (0,1)t t  , i.e., that neither marginal consumers can be at a 
boundary of the unit interval.  
The only closed form solution here are 𝑝1
∗ = 𝑝2
∗ = 𝑐𝐵. For θ<1, there is no closed 




Ap satisfies the following condition
10:  
Eqn69: 
* ** * * * *
1 1( ) )( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( )
2




            






( ) ( ) ( )
3 3
1
( ) ( ) ( )
3 3
A A A A A A
A A A A A A
E k v p p c q p






   

    

 
From the definitions of 𝑡0and  𝑡1, firm 1’s total market share for product B can be written 
as:  
Eqn71: 
      1 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 1
1 1 1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2
1 1 ( )
( )
2 2 2
B A A B B B
A A





   

   
                
   
   
 
 
* ** * * * *
1 1( ) )( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( )
2




            
 
𝑡0and𝑡1 can be written as: 
                                                 
10When θ=1, it implies 𝑝𝐴







( ) 1 ( ) ( )
2 2 3 3
1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 3 3
A A A A A A
A A A A A A
t v p p c q p
k







      
  
 
     





A At t v p
k
   
Note that so far, I have assumed 
0 1( , ) (0,1)t t  . However, there may be binding boundary 
constraints on these endogenous variables. In particular I have the following possibilities: 
Either 
0t or 1t or both could be at the end points of  [0,1]. 
3.2.4.2. Special Case: t1 = 1 
If the marginal consumer for the population that prefers both A and B is bounded 




( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1
2 2 3 3





       
  
 
The function of 1t  is at or outside of the boundary value of 1. Therefore the actual 
marginal customer will be constrained. Denote the constrained value of 
1t by 1t  1. Given 
the constraint 1t  1, firm 1 must still choose two part tariffs. These variables are denoted 
as , 1, 1,1 1 1,,A t t tp p E ; while 2, 2,1 1,t tE p denotes the decision variable for firm 2 in this bounded 
scenario. Hence, the profit optimization problem for both firms becomes: 
Eqn74: 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
, 1, 1,1 1 1
, , 1, 1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 0,
, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) )(1
Max
A t t t
A A B BA t A t t t t
B Bt t t t
p E p
p c q p p c q p E
p c q p E t


      
     
 
 
1 1 1 1
2, 2,1 1
2, 2, 2, 0,
,
( ) ( ) (1 )(1 )Max
t t
B Bt t t t
E p




The optimal solutions for this profit optimization are: 
Eqn75: 1, 2,
1, 2,




3 1 3 1
: ( ) ' ( ) ( ) 0
Bt t
t t
A A AA t A t A t A t
p p c
k k
E k E k








In this case, since 1t  1, that implies all consumers who values both A and B, purchases 
from firm 1. Given that condition,  it turns out that the marginal consumer for population 












t  has to be greater or equal to zero, so as long as θ <
3
5
, the marginal consumer 
10,t
t is valid. When θ ≥
3
5
,  there is no PSE outcome.  
3.2.4.3. Special Case: t0 = 0 
This is another special case, when the B-only marginal consumer for the population is 
zero or negative. In this case, the value of function of 0t is zero or below, given the solved 
price of A:  
Eqn77: 0
1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2 2 3 3









Denote by 0 0t  , the constrained value of 0t . In this case, the population which values 
only B only buys  only from firm 2.  
 
Given 0t = 0,  firm 1 and firm 2’s optimization problems are written as:  
Eqn78: 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0, 1, 1
, , 1, 1, 1, 1,
, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Max
t t tA
A t A A A t t B B t t t
p E p






Eqn79:  0 0 0 0
2, 2,0 0
2, 2, 2, 1,
,
( ) ( ) (1 )Max
t t
t B B t t t
E p
p c q p E t      
 
 
The optimal solutions for the usage charges are:  
Eqn80: 0 0 01, 2, ,
;t t B A t Ap p c p c    
The marginal consumer, for population which values A and B under this case is solved as 










   

 
Therefore for  0 0t   , it is necessary that 𝑡1 is bounded at 1. This, however, is impossible. 
Because when both marginal consumers are constrained at their boundary values, 0 0t   
and 1 1t  , the profit maximization problems for both firms become:  
 
Eqn82: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
, 1, 1,0 1 0 1 0 1
, , , , 1, , 1, , 1, ,
, , ,, ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Max
A t t t t t t
A A B BA t t A t t t t t t t t
p E p





Eqn83:  0 1 0 1 0 1
2, 2,0 1 0 1
2, , 2, , 2, ,
, ,,
( ) ( ) 1Max
t t t t
B Bt t t t t t
E p























3.2.4.4. A Special Case:θ = 1 
If θ= 1, the third stage equilibrium has a particularly simple form. Every customer 
in market B values A too, and chooses either purchasing both A and B from firm 1, or 
purchasing only B (giving up product A) from firm 2. In other words,  Firm 1’s profit 
becomes: 
Eqn85: 
 1 1 1 1
1 1, , ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Max A A A A B B
A AE p E p
p c q p p c q p E t     
Firm 2’s profit becomes: 
Eqn86: 
   2 2 2 1
2 2,
( ) ( ) 1Max B B
E p
p c q p E t     











A A A A
A A
p p c
v c v c
E k E k
p c
 
   

 
These equilibrium prices have the interesting implication that firm 2 can be forced out of 
business even if it has zero fixed costs. From 
*




A Av cE k  . Hence if 
( )
3
A Av ck  , firm 2 makes a negative profit. Intuitively, each 
consumer gets a surplus of 
2 ( )
3 3
A Av c 
 
 
 if he or she buys from firm 1 and consumes A. To 
attract the marginal consumer, firm 2 must compensate for the loss of utility from A. 
Hence, 
*
2E must be lower than 
*




A Av c 
 
 
. Therefore, if *1
( )
3
A Av cE k  , 
*
2E must be 
( )
3




3.2.4.5. Second Stage – Entry Decision 
It is easy to calculate equilibrium profits in closed form when 𝜃 = 1, but not for 
other cases, because there is no closed form solution for the unit price of product A. 
However, it is possible to show that firm 1 will always earn positive profit under a tied 
pricing regime. So, in the second stage, firm 1 will always choose to enter. For firm 2, as 
discussed in the third stage competition, when entry fee of firm 2 is positive, firm 2 will 
choose to enter in second stage. However, when firm 2’s entry fee is negative under tied 
pricing regime in equilibrium, firm 2 will have negative profit. Hence, it is rational for 
firm 2 to choose to not enter in the second stage.  
3.2.4.6. No Entry by Firm 2 
Under the tied pricing in the third stage, when the entry fee of firm 2 becomes 
negative, firm 2 chooses to stay out of the last stage of the game completely. If firm 1 has 
made a conditional pre-commitment in stage 1 and if 
*
2E <0 in third stage, entry is 
deterred, and this leaves firm 1 as monopoly in both A and B markets. Then, firm 1 will 
set separate two part tariff for both markets. Profit maximization of market A is done 
independently of B, and extracts ( )A Av c fully, while firm 1 gets to choose whether serves 
the whole market B or not:  
Eqn88: 
1




( ) ( )





p c q p E t
s t v p E kt
t








With the participation constrain for consumers in market B, as well as the constrain on 
the marginal consumer in market B, the profit maximization for firm 1 in market B can 
be written as a Lagrangian: 
Eqn89:  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) 1B B Bp c q p E t v p E kt t               




Once again, firm charges a per unit price at the marginal cost:  
Eqn90: 1 Bp c  
And the marginal customer in market B is: 
Eqn91: 1 11






There are two cases from this point, firm 1 has two choices: if it is serving less than all of 





B BE v c

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( ) 12 ( )
2
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<1, the case exists. Note that consumers of B makes positive consumer 
surplus in this case. Otherwise, it contradicts with 1t <1.  
The other case is when firm chooses 1t =1, and that implies that the entry fee for firm 1 is:  
Eqn94: 1 ( )B BE v c k 
  
In the market A, firm 1 will charge the monopoly pricing, as it did under independent 
pricing, charging 𝑝𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝐸𝐴





3.2.4.7. Summary of Stage 3 Equilibrium Results under Tied Pricing 
Given the discussion on tied pricing regimes with several boundary scenarios, I 
have concluded all the possible cases. The results are summarized below: 
 
Theorem 2 
Case 1.  𝒕𝟏 ∈  𝟎, 𝟏  𝒂𝒏𝒅  𝒕𝟎 ∈  𝟎, 𝟏 :   
The optimal strategies are defined as:   
 𝑝1
∗ = 𝑝2




( ) ( ) ( )
3 3
1
( ) ( ) ( )
3 3
A A A A A A
A A A A A A
E k v p p c q p






   









( ) 1 ( ) ( )
2 2 3 3
1 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 3 3
A A A A A A
A A A A A A
t v p p c q p
k







      
  
 
     
 
 
If θ<1, price of A has no closed form and defined by the following equation: 
** * * * * * *
1 1( ) )( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( )
2




          
 










A A A A
A A
p p c
v c v c
E k E k
p c
 
   

 
1.1. When θ = 1 and k≥
( )
3
A Av c , both firms choose to enter and third stage 
they compete and reach the equilibrium as defined above.  
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1.2. When θ = 1 and k<
( )
3
A Av c , then firm 2 will be earning negative profit 
in the third stage game. Therefore, in second stage, only firm 1 chooses to 
enter. Firm 1 becomes a monopoly in both markets in third stage, and will 
choose to serve either the whole market of B or part of B, depending on the 
underlying parameters.  
1.3.   When θ<1, there is no closed form for third stage competition, and the 
entry decision of firm 2 depends on the endogenous variable E2.  When 
E2≥0, both firms choose to enter and compete. When E2<0, then firm 2 will 
choose not to enter and firm 1 becomes a monopoly in both markets in third 
stage.  
 
Case 2.  𝒕𝟏 = 𝟏: 
 2.1 .𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝜽 <
𝟑
𝟓








3 1 3 1
( ) ' ( ) ( ) 0
Bt t
t t
A A AA t A t A t A t
p p c
k k
E k E k



















2.1 .𝑾𝒉𝒆𝒏 𝜽 ≥
𝟑
𝟓
 : There exists no PSEs in the third stage.  
Case 3. 𝒕𝟎 = 𝟎: 
 There exists no PSEs in the third stage, as 1t >1 always. 
 
Since most of these conditions are defined by endogenous functions of multiple 
parameters, it is hard to visualize when different types of SPNEs exists. Next, I use 
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Matlab to construct the space for the existence of different type of SPNEs in order for a 
better visualization to describe the results from theorem 2.  
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Note that it is true for all cases (including boundary scenarios) that firm 1 and 2 are going 
to charge at the marginal cost of product B as unit price in market B, and all three 
endogenous conditions above are independent of the demand parameters of product B 
and production cost of B.  Instead they depend on the demand and production parameters 
of product A, as well as the transportation cost k and the share θ of the population that 
values A and B.  
So, I will proceed through an example. Suppose demand of A and B, as well as 
marginal cost of B are defined as follows: 
Eqn96: 
( ) 24 5












Then I narrow the varying parameters down to 𝜃, 𝑘𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑐𝐴. For each given 𝜃, all three 
functions are defined as contour curves in the space of (𝑐𝐴 , 𝑘), and the existence and 
characteristics of PSEs can be described as some type of intersection of these conditions. 
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Here I have listed five consecutive charts which displace the contour curves for the 
following three functions as θ varies from 0.2 to 1. 
The areas that have PSEs are colored and different color represents different type 
of PSEs, described in Theorem 2.   
1. Firm 2 not enter and firm 1 behaves as a monopoly  (Blue) 
2. Firm 2 enters, and PSEs exists for non-boundary values of marginal customers 
(Yellow) 




  ) 
4. Firm 2 enters and no PSE exists (Purple) 












































I conclude from this that the possiblity of tied pricing can deter entry even without 
the positive fixed costs, as emphasized by Whiston. If entry does occur, firm 1 may still 
monopolize the market for consumers who values both A and B. 
3.2.5. Comparison of Independent and Tied Pricing Regimes 
The Nash equilibrium profits for both firms under independent pricing are:  
Eqn97: 
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The profit for firm 2 under independent pricing is: 
Eqn98:  
* *
2 2 2 2
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For the profit under tied pricing, it is easy to calculate the closed form expression when  
𝜃 = 1: 
Eqn99: 
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For θ<1, there is no closed form solution. Therefore, I use Matlab to calculate the 
numeric value of equilibrium strategies and profits when there exists a pure strategy 
equilibrium, based on the discussion in previous section.  
However, for θ=1, it is easy to show that profit under independent pricing for firm 
1 exceeds that under tying.  
Eqn101: 
* * * * * * *
1 1 1 1 1 1
2













































 >0 and tying is less profitable compared to independent pricing.   
3.3. SIMULATION EXAMPLES 
Assume a set of parameters for both markets:  
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( ) 24 5
















Then, in order to learn about the characteristics of the equilibria, I calculate equilibrium 
prices under both independent and tied pricing regimes based on varying  k and θ. The 
following chart shows the change in profit of firm 1 from both A and B markets when 
switching from independent pricing to tied pricing.  
Here, I am going to focus on the general case (case 1.1.)  where the PSE exists: 
where both marginal consumers 𝑡1and  𝑡0 are both less than 1 and greater than zero, and 
the entry fee for firm 2 is greater than zero. Note that all points plotted in the following 
charts represent the cases with existence of PSEs. All scenarios that lie beyond the 
conditions of general case PSE (described in case 1.1.), are omitted here.   
First, the optimal price of 𝑝𝐴 appears to be a nonlinear function of k and θ. The 
smaller θ is, the farther 𝑝𝐴 is from the marginal cost, but closer to the monopolistic price 
of A (if there is no entry fee of A under independent pricing). With smaller θ, firm 1 has a 
lower entry fees and tries to increase the profit in market A mainly through its unit price 
𝑝𝐴. With larger θ, firm 1 takes advantage of its leverage with larger A-and-B population, 
so it translates the increased leverage mainly through its entry fee under tied pricing, 
while keeping the marginal price level lower.  
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Figure 25: Equilibrium Price of A 
 



















































For a profit comparison, the following chart reveals an interesting observation: tied 
pricing is not as profitable as independent pricing in all these scenarios, when there are 
PSEs.  
Figure 27: Change in Firm 1’s profit under tying compared to independent pricing 
3.4. SUBGAME EQUILIBRIUM PATH 
From the discussion above, firm 1 makes positive profits in all Subgame of stage 
3, so it will certainly choose to enter in stage 2. In stage 2, firm 2 will not enter, given a 
conditional tying pre-commitment by firm 1, only if its optimal entry fee in the last stage 
is negative. Otherwise, firm 2 enters, regardless of any stage 1 announcement by firm 1. 
If the equilibrium entry fee for firm 2 is going to be positive under tying, firm 1 will 
never pre-commit to tying because it is pointless. Given that firm 2 will enter no matter 
what, firm 1 does better with independent pricing in stage 3. If the equilibrium entry fee 
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firm 2’s entry will effectively deter entry, leaving firm 1 to act as a monopolist over A 
and B.  
A moment’s thought shows firm 1 will never pre-commit unconditionally if it can 
pre-commit conditionally.  Therefore the Subgame perfect equilibrium path of the 3 stage 
game is as follows:  
1. If θ = 1 and k≥
( )
3
A Av c , there is no pre-commitment by firm 1. Entry occurs by 
both firms and firm 1 prices independently for A and B.  
2. If θ = 1 and k<
( )
3
A Av c , firm 1 conditionally pre-commits to tying upon firm 2’ s 
entry. Entry is deterred and firm 1 prices as a monopolist in A and B.  
3. If θ <1 , there is no closed form for equilibrium entry fee of firm 2 in the third 
stage. The PSE equilibria are described by the equilibrium maps.  
 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
Whinston’s classic paper on tying showed economists, one way of reconciling the 
possibility of exclusionary tying with the one monopoly rent theorem. In this essay, I 
specified Whinston’s differentiated products model to the Hotelling  case and then obtain 
sharper results on the relationship between pre-commitment to tying and the exclusion of 
a single product firm.  
My principal results are: 
 The firm 2 can be excluded even if it has zero fixed costs 
 If θ = 1 and k≥
( )
3
A Av c , pre-commitment to tying by firm 1 is pointless, since it 
does better by independent pricing than by tying; if θ = 1 and k<
( )
3
A Av c ,  firm 2 
can be excluded by a pre-commitment to tying.   
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 However, firm 1 will only choose conditional pre-commitment in order to 
exclude.  
My results extend those of Whiston, but do not alter the main policy implications of tying 






A.1. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES AND NOTES ON DATA SOURCE 
Source: EIA and CME 
Category:   Supply and Demand=Definition 
Balancing Item Represents the difference between the sum of the components of natural gas supply and the 
sum of the components of natural gas disposition. These differences may be due to quantities 
lost or to the effects of data reporting problems. Reporting problems include differences due 
to the net result of conversions of flow data metered at varying temperature and pressure 
bases and converted to a standard temperature and pressure base; the effect of variations in 
company accounting and billing practices; differences between billing cycle and calendar 
period time frames; and imbalances resulting from the merger of data reporting systems 
which vary in scope, format, definitions, and type of respondents.  
Consumption The use of natural gas as a source of heat or power or as a raw material input to a 
manufacturing process.  
Dry 
Production 
The process of producing consumer-grade natural gas. Natural gas withdrawn from 
reservoirs is reduced by volumes used at the production (lease) site and by processing 
losses. Volumes used at the production site include (1) the volume returned to reservoirs in 
cycling, repressuring of oil reservoirs, and conservation operations; and (2) gas vented and 
flared. Processing losses include (1) nonhydrocarbon gases (e.g., water vapor, carbon 
dioxide, helium, hydrogen sulfide, and nitrogen) removed from the gas stream; and (2) gas 
converted to liquid form, such as lease condensate and plant liquids. Volumes of dry gas 
withdrawn from gas storage reservoirs are not considered part of production. Dry natural 
gas production equals marketed production less extraction loss.  
Extraction 
Loss 
The reduction in volume of natural gas due to the removal of natural gas liquid constituents 
such as ethane, propane, and butane at natural gas processing plants.  
Gross 
Withdrawals 
Full well-stream volume, including all natural gas plant liquids and all nonhydrocarbon 
gases, but excluding lease condensate. Also includes amounts delivered as royalty payments 
or consumed in field operations.  
Marketed 
Production 
Gross withdrawals less gas used for repressuring, quantities vented and flared, and 





Category:   Prices 
Futures Price The price quoted for delivering a specified quantity of a commodity at a specified time and 
place in the future.  
Spot Price The price for a one-time open market transaction for immediate delivery of a specific 
quantity of product at a specific location where the commodity is purchased "on the spot" 
at current market rates.  
Henry Hub Spot 
Price 




Henry Hub Natural Gas Futures (Physical) are an outright natural gas contract between a 
buyer and a seller that offers opportunities for risk management of the highly volatile 
pricing of natural gas. The contract: 
Is widely used as a national benchmark price for natural gas, which accounts for almost a 
quarter of United States energy  
Reflects a vigorous basis market based on the pricing relationships between Henry Hub and 
other important natural gas market centers in the continental United States and Canada  
Is the second-highest volume futures contract in the world based on a physical commodity 
Unit of trading is 10,000 million British thermal units (mmBtu). 
WTI Spot Price West Texas Intermediate (WTI – Cushing)  is a crude stream produced in Texas and 
southern Oklahoma which serves as a reference or "marker" for pricing a number of other 




An outright crude oil contract between a buyer and seller. The contracts also serve as a key 
international pricing benchmark. Crude oil is the world's most actively traded commodity. 
Light, sweet crudes are preferred by refiners because of their low sulfur content and 
relatively high yields of high-value products such as gasoline, diesel fuel, heating oil, and 
jet fuel. 
Unit of trading is 1,000 barrels  
Delivery point is Cushing, Oklahoma, which is also accessible to the international spot 
markets via pipelines  
Delivery provided for several grades of domestic and internationally traded foreign crudes  
Six types of options: American style, calendar spread, crack spreads, average price, 
European style and daily 
Contract 1 A futures contract specifying the earliest delivery date. Natural gas contracts expire three 
business days prior to the first calendar day of the delivery month. Thus, the delivery 
month for Contract 1 is the calendar month following the trade date. For crude oil, each 
contract expires on the third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of the month 
preceding the delivery month. If the 25th calendar day of the month is a non-business day, 
trading ceases on the third business day prior to the business day preceding the 25th 
calendar day. After a contract expires, Contract 1 for the remainder of that calendar month 
is the second following month. 
 
Category:   Storage 
Base (cushion) 
Gas 
The volume of gas needed as a permanent inventory to maintain adequate reservoir 
pressures and deliverability rates throughout the withdrawal season. All native gas is 
included in the base gas volume.  
Net Withdrawals The amount by which storage withdrawals exceed storage injections.  
Underground 
Gas Storage 
The use of sub-surface facilities for storing gas that has been transferred from its original 
location. The facilities are usually hollowed-out salt domes, natural geological reservoirs 
(depleted oil or gas fields) or water-bearing sands topped by an impermeable cap rock 







Gas removed from underground storage reservoirs.  
Working(top 
storage) Gas 
The volume of gas in the reservoir that is in addition to the cushion or base gas. It may or 
may not be completely withdrawn  
 
Category:   Weather 
Cooling Degree 
Days (CDD) 
A measure of how warm a location is over a period of time relative to a base 
temperature, most commonly specified as 65 degrees Fahrenheit. The measure is 
computed for each day by subtracting the base temperature (65 degrees) from the 
average of the day's high and low temperatures, with negative values set equal to zero. 
Each day's cooling degree-days are summed to create a cooling degree-day measure for a 
specified reference period. Cooling degree-days are used in energy analysis as an 
indicator of air conditioning energy requirements or use. 
Heating degree-
days (HDD) 
A measure of how cold a location is over a period of time relative to a base temperature, 
most commonly specified as 65 degrees Fahrenheit. The measure is computed for each 
day by subtracting the average of the day's high and low temperatures from the base 
temperature (65 degrees), with negative values set equal to zero. Each day's Heating 
degree-days are summed to create a Heating degree-day measure for a specified 
reference period. Heating degree-days are used in energy analysis as an indicator of 
space Heating energy requirements or use.  
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  
Normal Weather 
 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’S 30-year average for 
heating and cooling degree-days as a benchmark for normal weather 
 
 
A.2. NOTES ON DATA SOURCE 
Source: EIA and CME 
Dry Production: Form EIA-895, "Monthly and Annual Quantity and Value of Natural 
Gas Production Report”.    
Consumption: 1973-1975: Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, "Natural Gas" chapter. 
1976-1978: EIA, Energy Data Reports, Natural Gas Annual. 1979: EIA, Natural Gas 
Production and Consumption, 1979. 1980-1989: Form EIA-176, "Annual Report of 
Natural and Supplemental Gas Supply and Disposition" and Form EIA-759, "Monthly 
Power Plant Report" . 1990: Form EIA-176, "Annual Report of Natural and 
Supplemental Gas Supply and Disposition" ,Form EIA-759, "Monthly Power Plant 
Report" and Form EIA-64A, "Annual Report of the Origin of Natural Gas Liquids 
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Production" . 1991-1995: Form EIA-176, "Annual Report of Natural and Supplemental 
Gas Supply and Disposition" ,Form EIA-759, "Monthly Power Plant Report" Form EIA-
64A, "Annual Report of the Origin of Natural Gas Liquids Production" and EIA-627, 
"Annual Quantity and Value of Natural Gas Report." 1996-2000: Form EIA-895, 
"Monthly and Annual Quantity and Value of Natural Gas Production Report" ,Form EIA-
857, "Monthly Report of Natural Gas Purchases and Deliveries to Consumers" , Form 
EIA-759, "Monthly Power Plant Report" , EIA computations, and Natural Gas Annual 
2000. 2001-current Form EIA-895, "Monthly and Annual Quantity and Value of Natural 
Gas Production Report" , Form EIA-857, "Monthly Report of Natural Gas Purchases and 
Deliveries to Consumers" and Form EIA-759, "Monthly Power Plant Report" . 
Spot Price: Thomson Reuters 
Future Prices: New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) 
Storage: 1979 and prior data from the American Gas Association, Committee on 
Underground Storage, The Storage of Gas in the United States and Canada. 1980 to 
current data from Form EIA-191M, "Monthly Underground Gas Storage Report" ; Form 
EIA-191A, "Annual Underground Gas Storage Report" ; Form EIA-176, "Annual Report 





A.3. APPENDIX FOR SOLVING INDEPENDENT PRICING AND TIED PRICING MODELS 
A.3.1. Solving for profit maximization of firm 1 when firm 2 does not enter: 
Firm 1 will set separate two part tariff for both markets. Profit maximization of market A 
is identical to independent pricing case, while firm 1 gets to choose whether serves the 
whole market B or not:  
Eqn 102   
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With the participation constrain for consumers in market B, as well as the constrain on 
the marginal consumer in market B, the profit maximization for firm 1 in market B can 
be written as a Lagrangian: 
Eqn 103   
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,  the marginal consumer can be written as : 1t


 . The firm earns zero profit 
if 
1t =0, as it can always earn positive profit by choosing a 1t >0. Therefore, for 1t >0, it 
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Once again, firm charges a per unit price at the marginal cost. There are two cases from 
this point, firm 1 has two choices: either choose 1t











( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
B B B B
B B B B
c c q c E k









     











 , substitute  
1 1
1






































And, the firm chooses to sell to a fraction of the B market as the marginal consumer is 
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<1, the case exists. Otherwise, it contradicts with 
1t <1.  
The other case is when firm chooses 
1t =1, and that implies that the entry fee for firm 1 
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A.3.2. Solving for tied pricing profit maximization when θ=1: 
 
Firm 1’s profit becomes: 
 
Eqn 104  1 1 1 1
1 1, , ,
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Firm 2’s profit becomes: 
Eqn 105     2 2 2 1
2 2,
( ) ( ) 1Max B B
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The first order conditions for firm 1 are simplified: 
With respect to 𝐸1: 
Eqn 106  1 1 1 1
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With respect to 𝑝1: 
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The first order conditions for firm 2 are: 
With respect to 𝐸2: 
Eqn 109    2 2 2 2
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With respect to 𝑝2: 
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, we can get the following substitution: 
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, 11 t can also be written as a substitution: 
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, the first order condition solves for p2: 
Eqn 115  
   2 21 2 1 2
2 2
2
( ) ' )(1 ) ( ( ) 1 ( ) 0
( ) ' ( ) 0
B B B B
B B
B
p c q p qt p t q p
p c q p
p c













( ) ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1





A A A B B B BA B B A A B B
A A
c c q c c c q c E v c v c v c E E
k k
E k v c E
           
  
 









( ) ( ) 1
2
1 1





B B B B B B A A B B
A A
c c q c E
k
v c v c v c E E
k
E k v c E
         
  
 









A A A A
A A












A Av cE k    
A.3.3. Profit maximization of firm 1 when firm 2 does not enter and θ=1 
 
Firm 1 no longer needs to do tying pricing. Instead, it can set two part tariff for each 
market, as a monopoly in both. In market B, it can choose whether to sell to the entire B 
market or not:   
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 So, given the assumption of firm 2 staying out of the market as 
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A Av ck  ,  there are 
two possible solutions, depending on the parameters of the model:  
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Under this scenario, given ( )
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 ,   if firm chooses to serve the entire 
B market, it will be charging per unit price 𝑝1 = 𝑐𝐵 and entry fee 𝐸1 = 𝑣𝐵 𝑐𝐵 − 𝑘 . 
However, serving the market not whole is definitely is at least as profitable as serving the 
entire market, because: 
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A Av ck  , then firm only has 
one choice, which is to serve the entire B market because 
( ) 3 ( )
1
2 2 ( )
B B B B
A A
v c v c
k v c
   , and its 
strategies are: 
* * *
1 1 1, 1, ( )B B Bp c t E v c k     
In the market A, firm 1 will charge the monopoly pricing, as it did under independent 
pricing, charging 𝑝𝐴
∗ = 𝑐𝐴 and 𝐸𝐴
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